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SUMMARY
Understanding how policy measures affect long term economic growth in de-
veloping countries is not only an interesting academic topic, but a topic of
severe importance for the billions of people living in poverty today. A much
debated topic in the 1990s was the relationship between macroeconomic poli-
cies and growth in developing countries. This debate was made relevant by
the structural adjustment programs initiated by the World Bank and the IMF
to make developing countries pursue policies that they perceived to be pro-
moting growth. An important part of these structural adjustment programs
was promote a stable macroeconomic framework.
One of many research papers investigating the relationship between macro-
economic stability and economic growth is Michael Bleaney’s (1996) "Macro-
economic stability, investment and growth in developing countries" published
in Journal of development economics. He intended to test whether the quality
of macroeconomic management has any impact on investment and growth:
Any [exogenous] shock to the economic system is likely to be re-
flected in macroeconomic statistics. [. . . ] [G]overnment policy
can influence the reaction to the shock but not the shock itself.
The issue here is the ability of the government to minimise the
destabilising impact of such shocks and to avoid creating unneces-
sary macroeconomic uncertainty by its own policy decisions. Do
countries which are successful in doing this [. . . ] experience signif-
icantly higher rates of investment and faster output growth rates
than those which fail?
(Bleaney, 1996, p. 465)
To investigate this question, he does a cross section regression analysis of
41 developing countries. He finds some evidence that his measures of policy
induced macroeconomic instability are significantly negatively associated with
growth, when controlling for the level of investments. However, he finds
no conclusive evidence for a significant association between macroeconomic
instability and investment.
Seventeen years has passed since Bleaney (1996) published his article,
and since then the debate in the growth literature has emphasized other
factors that determine growth. Recent research within the growth literature
have emphasized the importance of such factors as institutions, culture and
geography in determining growth rates (Acemoglu, 2009). These are also
variables that are very persistent over time. If these variables are correlated
with Bleaney’s indicators of macroeconomic mismanagement, his estimates
would be biased. Do his results still hold when the analysis is extended and
country specific effects are controlled for? The purpose of this thesis is to
answer that question. The amount of available data is far greater now than
17 years ago. I exploit the opportunities that this additional data gives by
doing extended cross section regressions and panel data regressions.
Bleaney (1996) uses the central government budget surplus, real exchange
rate volatility, government debt level and the inflation rate as indicators of
macroeconomic (in)stability. His results show a negative correlation between
budget deficits and growth, and between real exchange rate volatility and
growth. I find evidence that high government debt and very high inflation
rates are detrimental to economic growth, but I find no evidence that budget
deficits or real exchange rate volatility are significantly associated to growth.
Neither do I find conclusive evidence that any of the indicators have any
impact on the investment rate. I show that Bleaney’s results are little robust
to exclusion of outliers, and that his results can possibly be explained by
omitted variable biases.
Though my results show a statistically significant negative association be-
tween initial government debt and growth, and between inflation and growth,
the economic significance seems to be weak. I investigate whether a threshold
model rather than a linear relationship seems to fit the data better and find
evidence that it does. I propose that the initial government debt level and in-
flation rate have no effect on growth at moderate levels, but when they reach
unsustainable levels, they have a serious negative impact on growth rates. To
test this hypothesis I include dummy variables for initial government debt
above 90 % and average inflation rate above 25 % in the regressions. The
results show that the threshold model fits better to the data than the lin-
ear model, and that reaching unsustainable levels of government debt and
inflation has a strong negative impact on growth rates.
Bleaney (1996) interprets his results as an indication that policy induced
macroeconomic instability impedes growth. I find this statement too general,
and argue that it is necessary to look at each of the indicators individually.
I argue that my results can be explained by debt overhangs preventing gov-
ernments from getting access to credits, and thus inhibiting public – and
possibly also private – investment, and by economic contractions during in-
flation crises.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Understanding how policy measures affect long term economic growth in de-
veloping countries is not only an interesting academic topic, but a topic of
severe importance for the billions of people living in poverty today. A much
debated topic in the 1990s was the relationship between macroeconomic poli-
cies and growth in developing countries. This debate was made relevant by
the structural adjustment programs initiated by the World Bank and the
IMF to make developing countries pursue a policy that they perceived to be
promoting growth:
Macroeconomic stability and rapid export growth were two key ele-
ments in starting the virtuous circles of high rates of accumulation,
efficient allocation and strong productivity growth that formed the
basis for East Asia’s success.
(World Bank, 1993, p. 105)
There are several earlier works trying to find empirical evidence for an as-
sociation between different indicators of macroeconomic stability or macroe-
conomic mismanagement and growth. One well known contribution is a paper
by Dani Rodrik (1999). He focuses on how the interaction between underly-
ing conflicts between different groups within a country and bad institutions
of conflict management disables countries from implementing the necessary
macroeconomic adjustments to external shocks, and how this harms long term
economic growth. Other influential contributions are Kormendi and Meguire
(1985) who find support for Robert Barro’s (1980) hypothesis that variability
in the money supply adversely affects growth, Stanley Fischer (1993) who
finds significantly negative correlations between inflation rates, government
budget deficit and currency overvaluation and economic growth in a sample of
101 developed and developing countries, and Michael Bleaney (1996), who’s
analysis this paper is based on.
Bleaney (1996) intended to test whether the quality of macroeconomic
management has any impact on investment and growth:
Any [exogenous] shock to the economic system is likely to be re-
flected in macroeconomic statistics. [. . . ] [G]overnment policy
can influence the reaction to the shock but not the shock itself.
The issue here is the ability of the government to minimise the
destabilising impact of such shocks and to avoid creating unneces-
sary macroeconomic uncertainty by its own policy decisions. Do
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countries which are successful in doing this [. . . ] experience signif-
icantly higher rates of investment and faster output growth rates
than those which fail?
(Bleaney, 1996, p. 465)
To investigate this question, he does a cross section regression analysis of
41 developing countries. He finds some evidence that his measures of policy
induced macroeconomic instability are significantly negatively associated with
growth, when controlling for the level of investments. However, he finds
no conclusive evidence for a significant association between macroeconomic
instability and investment.
17 years has passed since Bleaney (1996) published his article, and since
then the debate in the growth literature has emphasized other factors that
determine growth. Recent research within the growth literature have empha-
sized the importance of such factors as institutions, culture and geography
in determining growth rates (Acemoglu, 2009). These are also variables that
are very persistent over time. If these variables are correlated with Bleaney’s
indicators of macroeconomic mismanagement, his estimates would be biased.
Do his results still hold when the analysis is extended and country specific ef-
fects are controlled for? The purpose of this thesis is to answer this question.
The amount of available data is far greater now than 17 years ago. I will
exploit the opportunities that this additional data gives by doing extended
cross section regressions and fixed effect panel regressions.1
Bleaney (1996) uses the central government budget surplus, real exchange
rate volatility, government debt level and the inflation rate as indicators of
macroeconomic (in)stability. His results show a negative correlation between
budget deficits and growth, and between real exchange rate volatility and
growth. I find evidence that high government debt and very high inflation
rates are detrimental to economic growth, but I find no evidence that budget
deficits or real exchange rate volatility are significantly associated to growth.
Neither do I find conclusive evidence that any of the indicators have any
impact on the investment rate. I show that Bleaney’s results are little robust
to exclusion of outliers, and that his results can possibly be explained by an
omitted variable bias.
Bleaney (1996, p. 476) interprets his results as an indication that policy
induced macroeconomic instability impedes growth. I find this statement
too general, and argue that it is necessary to look at each of the indicators
individually. I argue that my results can be explained by debt overhangs
preventing governments from getting access to credits, and thus inhibiting
public – and possibly also private – investment, and by economic contractions
during inflation crises.
I will start by presenting some economic theory that explains the channels
through which macroeconomic instability might affect economic growth (in
chapter 2). The methodology used by Bleaney (1996) and in this paper will
1 I used Stata to calculate all estimates in this thesis.
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be laid out in chapter 3, while the issue of measuring macroeconomic stability
will be assessed in chapter 4. The main results are presented in chapter 5.
Further investigation and discussion of potential methodological problems as
well as causal linkages will be discussed in chapter 6, before I draw some
concluding remarks in chapter 7.
2. THEORY
The possible theoretical linkages between macroeconomic stability and eco-
nomic growth are many. I will not try to give a complete review of them here,
but I will highlight some of the possible linkages that I find most relevant.
Before looking into the theories, I find it useful to explain what I mean
by macroeconomic stability. The World Bank describes the macroeconomic
framework as stable "when the inflation rate is low and predictable, real inter-
est rates are appropriate, the real exchange rate is competitive and predictable
... and the balance of payments situation is perceived as viable" (World Bank,
1990). One could also include stability in output (as measured by GDP) and
unemployment rates, which for many is the first thing that comes to mind
when they think about macroeconomic fluctuations. However, for reasons
explained below, these are not included as indicators of good macroeconomic
management in this thesis.
When facing an external shock, the government may face a dilemma where
it has to choose between stability in inflation, real exchange rates and a viable
fiscal policy on the one hand and stability in output and unemployment rates
on the other. Choosing stability in the latter at expense of the former is often
perceived to be bad macroeconomic management, because it is detrimental
to output and unemployment rates in the long run (Kydland and Prescott,
1977). I will not enter into a discussion about which policy is best in the
long term. This can probably vary from case to case, depending on a wide
range of circumstances. However, I will focus this thesis on the impact that
a low and stable inflation, a stable real exchange rate and a viable fiscal
policy have on growth, ignoring potential effects of fluctuations in output
and unemployment.
I will first look into what economic theory tells us about the effect macroe-
conomic instability can be expected to have on investments. If macroeconomic
instability is inhibiting growth through depressing investments, as the World
Bank (1990) believed, it must be so that higher investment rates cause higher
growth rates. Though the empirical evidence of correlation between invest-
ment and growth is robust, the causal relationship is far from agreed upon
among economists. I will therefore shortly present theoretical frameworks
that seek to explain this relationship.
In the last two sections of this chapter I will present some theoretical con-
siderations on how different aspects of macroeconomic instability can affect
growth more directly, through its effect on total factor productivity rather
than through its effect on the investment rate.
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2.1 The effect of macroeconomic instability on investments
One of the most obvious linkages between macroeconomic instability and
growth, also emphasized by Bleaney (1996), is the effect macroeconomic in-
stability might have on investments. Greater macroeconomic instability in-
creases uncertainty about the returns to investments through at least three
channels. Instability in inflation rates and nominal exchange rates causes a
higher real exchange rate risk for investors investing in export oriented and
import dependent production, because their future earnings depends on these
highly instable variables. Variability in inflation and exchange rates affect do-
mestic demand both directly and indirectly. Directly by affecting the terms
of trade, and thus shifting demand from domestically produced goods to im-
ported goods or the other way around. Indirectly through affecting the level
of production, and thus income and consumption demand. This increases the
uncertainty about future earnings of firms and thus the risk of the invest-
ments. High macroeconomic instability may also cause political instability. It
is often seen that for example periods of high inflation generates social unrest
and political discontent (Paldam, 1987). This may be because the wages of
the poor do not keep up with the prices of necessity goods, or because it
induces higher job insecurity through depressing production. Higher political
instability may be an important factor in assessing the risk of an investment,
and is shown to be negatively correlated to the level of investments (Rodrik,
1991).
The average central government budget surplus and the initial government
debt are used as indicators of macroeconomic (in)stability in this thesis. These
variables deserve some special attention here, because they are likely to af-
fect investment in physical capital in other ways than through generating
uncertainty about the future.
Budget deficits normally have to be financed throug borrowing. If some
of the debt is borrowed at the domestic market, this increases the demand
for funds in the domestic credit market. If the country is not fully financially
open, this will contribute to increasing the interest rate (Edwards and Khan,
1985). A higher interest rate means that some of the investments that would
have been profitable with a lower interest rate no longer are, and thus invest-
ments in productive capital will be reduced due to an increase in government
borrowing. Blinder and Solow (1973) refer to this situation as crowding out
of investments in real capital.
If the initial level of government debt is high, the chance that the govern-
ment will be unable to service its debt increases. At some point the investors
will realize that it is unlikely that the country will be able to repay its debt.
This means that they will refuse to lend any more money to the country, or
at least demand a very high interest rate, so that the country in practice is
unable to borrow. Without access to credit the government will no longer
be able to finance public investments, even the ones that would have yielded
great returns. Krugman (1988) refers to this situation as a debt overhang.
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2.2 Links between investment and growth
If macroeconomic stability promotes growth through the investment chan-
nel, it must also be so that investment promotes growth. Empirically, the
correlation between investment and growth is one of the most statistically
robust ones in the growth literature (Levine and Renelt, 1992). However,
there exists no consensus on the causal relationship between them. I will
therefore spend some time discussing some theories that can explain this
relationship. I will first present two models that explain how investments
generate growth, namely the Solow model and the AK model. Thereafter
I will present some theoretical explanations to why the correlation between
investment and growth is high even though investment does not generate
sustained economic growth.
2.2.1 Investment generated growth
In the classical Solow-Swan model, sustained economic growth can only be
achieved through technological progress. Increasing the investment rate will
cause an increase in the level of capital per worker, and thus in the per capita
output. The growth will continue until the depreciation and dilution of capital
equals investments (see Fig. 1).











This growth is temporary, and only lasts from one steady state to another,
but how long this takes depends on the parameter values. To get an idea
about what the Solow model predicts, let’s take a look at an example:
Product function: F pK,Lq “ AKαphLq1´α, 0 ă α ă 1 (2.1)
In per capita terms: fpkq “ Akαh1´α, k “ K{L (2.2)
Steady state: sfpkq “ pn` δqk (2.3)
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Where A is a measure of productivity, K is physical capital, L is labor, h
is human capital, n is population growth and δ is the depreciation rate of
physical capital. For simplicity, I will set A “ h “ 1, and assume that
there is no population growth, no technological growth and no growth in the
level of human capital. To see how an increase in the investment rate (s)
affects growth in the Solow model, let’s set α “ 0.3 and δ “ 0.1, and see
what happens if the investment rate increases from 0.1 to 0.2. Fig. 2 shows
how the growth rate develops over time after a jump in the investment rate
from 0.1 to 0.2 in period t “ 1. We see that this increase in investment
rate contributes to a significantly higher growth rate, even 14 years after the
increase. Keeping in mind that the parameter values are speculative and the
increase in investment rate might be implausibly large, we see that it is not
impossible that part of the differences in growth rates among countries can
be explained by differences in investment rates, even within the Solow model
framework.







If we have a product function where capital is not subject to diminishing
returns, sustained growth can in fact be achieved through capital accumula-
tion. The AK model is a growth model where there are constant returns to
capital:
Product function: F pKptqq “ AKptq (2.4)







“ sA´ n´ δ (2.6)
Here, we see that as long as
s ą n` δ
A
economic growth will continue forever as a result of capital accumulation.
Even though the AK model offers an explanation to the observed relation-
ship between investment and growth, it seems completely unreasonable the-
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oretically. Imagine a worker at a factory who needs a certain machine to
work. If he has one machine, and we give him another one, he becomes twice
as productive. If we give him two new machines, his productivity doubles
again, and so on. It seems theoretically implausible that this process can
go on forever without the marginal productivity of en extra machine to be
decreasing.
However, Romer (1986) argues that if knowledge is a by-product of capital
accumulation and knowledge is non-rival and an important factor in the pro-
duction function, there might in fact be constant or even increasing returns to
scale of capital accumulation. To see why, consider the following production
function:
Y “ AKαL1´αZη (2.7)
y “ AkαZη (2.8)
ZpKq “ BK “ BkL (2.9)
y “ ApBLqηkα`η (2.10)
Where Z is knowledge, which is an increasing function of the level of capital
accumulated. Now, we see that if there is no population growth and α`η “ 1,
this is essentially the AK model, with constant returns to scale.
2.2.2 Other explanations to the relationship
In addition to these theories on how investments promote growth, I want to
emphasize three different explanations to why the correlation between invest-
ment and growth is not necessarily a sign that investment generates sustained
growth.
One explanation to the correlation between investment and growth that
can also be explained within the framework of the Solow model, is that coun-
tries have different production functions. Some countries are able to adopt
new technology that makes capital much more productive. In the Solow
model we can think of this technology shift as a shift to a higher α. As shown
below (eq. 2.12), a higher α means a higher optimal rate of investment. If
this new technology facilitates growth and leads to a higher investment rate,
this might be an explanation to why the correlation seems to be so robust.








Optimal savings rate: s˚ “ pn` δq
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k˚1´αhα´1










The other two explanations can be thought of within the framework of a
simple Keynes model. If the economy has free production capacity, and the
supply responds to demand, increased investment would directly lead to a
higher output. This is simply because the investments themselves generate
economic activity by utilizing workers and capital that would not otherwise
be in use, and not because new machinery or infrastructure makes production
more efficient.
A third explanation to the relationship is that it is growth that causes
investments, and not the other way around. This might be because firms
receive high profits in years of high growth, and they use this profit to invest
in new capital. It might also be that investors invest more when they expect
high growth, because high growth means high demand and high profits.
The main message from this section is that it is not clear that investments
generate sustained growth, even though this is often taken for granted by some
economists. If investments do not generate growth, it cannot be the case that
macroeconomic stability promotes growth through its effect on investments.
2.3 Relative prices and allocation of factors of production
In addition to the possibility that macroeconomic instability affects growth
through its effect on investment, in this and the following section, I want
to present theories that explain how it can affect productivity more directly.
The first theoretical argument, also emphasized by Fischer (1993), is straight
forward and focuses on the effect macroeconomic instability has on an efficient
resource allocation.
In order for free markets to secure an effective allocation of resources, one
of the conditions that has to be fulfilled is that all actors have accurate infor-
mation about relative prices. If inflation is high and unstable, it is hard for a
producer to know what the prices and wages will be in the future. It is also
very likely that it will be hard to know what the price of the output good will
be relative to the price of inputs, and thus hard to plan how much to produce
and how much to use of each input. This can cause large inefficiencies, in
the sense that production will be lower than what would have been possible
if there was certainty about relative prices (Fischer, 1993).
2.4 Outward orientation, instability and industrial clusters
The relationship between trade orientation and economic growth is probably
one of the most debated topics in the growth literature (see e.g. Dollar, 1992;
Sachs et al., 1995; Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001). There is no clear academic
consensus on whether outward orientation promotes growth, and if it does,
through which mechanisms it works. Different theories focus on how outward
orientation gives an economy access to financial capital from abroad, to new
technology and lets the economy increase total factor productivity by moving
factors to sectors in which it has a comparative advantage (Acemoglu, 2009).
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New trade theory (see e.g. Krugman, 1991) focuses on how access to larger
markets allow countries to benefit from economies of scale. This is the theory
I will use (in this section) to explain how instability, especially through real
exchange rate volatility, can have a negative impact on growth.
Underlying the assumption that real exchange rate volatility increases
uncertainty about profits in the export sector, lies a simple profit function,
where a firm receives its revenue in foreign currency and pays expenses in
domestic currency:
ΠpP˚, E, P q “ RpP˚, Eq ´ CpP q
Where Π is profit, R is the revenue function, C is the cost function, P˚ is
the price level abroad, P is the domestic price level and E is the nominal
exchange rate. R is increasing in P˚ and E, while C is increasing in P , and
thus Π is increasing in P˚ and E, and declining in C. Since the real exchange
rate is defined as RER “ P˚E
P
it is a good approximation that the profits in
the export sector depend positively on the real exchange rate:
BΠ
BRER ą 0
For firms producing for the domestic market, but relying on imported inputs,
the relationship would be the opposite, but volatility in the real exchange
rate will have the same effect for both types of firms. To keep the discussion
simple I will focus on firms in the export sector, but the arguments also hold
for firms producing for the domestic market with imported inputs.
Real exchange rate volatility increases the risk for investments in the ex-
port sector, which means that investors would require a high risk premium
for being willing to invest in the export sector, which in turn will lead to a
low level of investments in the export sector. This is only part of the story,
because increased exchange rate volatility also means that the frequency of
firm bankruptcy will be high in this sector. This is especially true in countries
with poorly developed financial markets. To illustrate why, I will present a
very simple model based on Aghion et al. (2009).
Imagine that in order to continue production in period t` 1 the firm has
to pay a cost I in period t. Think of this as an investment that the firm has to
do before every period. If there are no credit constraints, the firm will choose
to pay the cost and continue production, as long as the expected profit in
period t` 1 is greater than the cost in period t:
It ă βEpΠpRERqt`1q, β “ 1
1` r
Where r is the discount rate. However, if there are credit constraints an
additional requirement for production to continue is that the firm has enough
liquidity to finance the investment. Let the amount the firm is able to borrow
in period t equal pµ ´ 1qΠt, where µ is a measure of financial development.
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The total amount of liquidity the firm has available in period t is then µΠt.
The additional requirement then becomes:
µΠt ą It
Here we assume that the firm does not save any of its profits from one period
to another. This assumption might seem unrealistic, but it might not be
unreasonable for small and new firms that have not been able to acquire
much equity.
We see that if the level of financial development (µ) is low and the real
exchange rate was low in one year, the firm might not be able to pay the
necessary cost to continue production in the next year. An implication of an
increased real exchange rate volatility is that, for a given level of financial
development, the likelihood of being unable to finance the cost of continuing
production increases.
Furthermore, this high frequency of firm bankruptcies might hinder the de-
velopment of industrial clusters, where firms benefit from economies of scale.
Marshall (1920) showed how industrial clusters may help firms to compete,
due to the presence of economies of scale. He focused on three important
sources to economies of scale: The presence of a pool of specialized work-
ers, easy access to suppliers of specialized inputs and services and knowledge
spillovers between firms. Higher frequency of firms going out of business is
likely to reduce the presence of all these positive externalities, and thus hinder
development of the cluster itself.
In an industry cluster where different firms have very specialized tasks, all
firms depend on many other firms. Producers of final goods depend on sub-
contractors that deliver very specialized inputs or services, while producers
of inputs and services are so specialized that they are dependent on deliv-
ering their outputs to specific producers of a final good. Their equipment
and knowledge is so specialized that they cannot easily shift production to
something else if their costumer goes out of business. If one producer of a
final good goes bankrupt, it is likely that some of the firms delivering in-
puts and services to that firm also will go bankrupt. These firms might have
been crucial to other producers of a final good, and their disappearance may
cause problems for that firm, and so on. This puts an effective end to any
development of industrial clusters.
Building up specialized knowledge about production takes time. The
longer a firm lives, the more knowledge it manages to build up, at least up
to a certain age. If knowledge spillover is an important source of economies
of scale, then firms will benefit more from positive externalities, the more old
firms there are. Hence, a higher rate of firm bankruptcies hinders this source
of economies of scale.
There are many factors that have to be in place for a cluster to de-
velop. Without the economies of scale stemming from specialized suppliers
and knowledge spillovers it is also unlikely that a pool of specialized workers
should emerge.
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Hence, high real exchange rate volatility makes it unlikely that industry
clusters develop, and therefore countries with high real exchange rate volatil-
ity are unable to take advantage of this aspect of openness.
In this chapter I have shown that macroeconomic instability can be ex-
pected to affect growth through at least three channels. The first is the
adverse effect it may have on capital accumulation. The second is more di-
rectly by inhibiting total factor productivity by making the price mechanism
less efficient, causing an efficient allocation of factors of production (Fischer,
1993). The third is through hindering development of industrial clusters. In
the next chapter I will discuss how we can empirically investigate to what
extent macroeconomic instability affects investment and growth.
3. METHODOLOGY
If suitable measures of macroeconomic stability can be found (I will return
to this question in chapter 4), Bleaney (1996) argues that the effects macroe-
conomic instability have on growth can be tested through a well established
framework for empirical testing of growth models (see e.g. Barro, 1991; Levine
and Renelt, 1992). In this chapter I will first present the methodological
framework used by Bleaney (1996). I will then present how I will extend his
analysis, before I discuss one of the most serious shortcomings of our method-
ological frameworks, namely that we ignore the fact that the investment rate
is most likely endogenous.
3.1 The framework used by Bleaney (1996)
The framework Bleaney (1996) uses is the following:
GRi “ α ` ψINVi `Xiβ `Ziγ ` i, i “ 1, ..., n (3.1)
Where GR is the growth rate of GDP per capita, INV is a measure of the
growth rate of physical capital, X is a vector of control variables, Z is a vector
of indicators of macroeconomic stability and α is a constant. The subscript
i denotes that this is the observation for country i. The underlying theory
behind this framework is the neoclassical growth model, with physical and
human capital and labor as the factors of production. As a proxy to the
growth rate in physical capital, he uses the ratio of investment to GDP. The
significance of this variable in growth regressions is the most consistent result
in previous research (Levine and Renelt, 1992). The variables he chose to
include as controls were (with some modifications) the variables that Levine
and Renelt (1992) found as robust determinants of growth. Their study tested
the robustness of many variables that have been suggested as conducive to
growth. In addition to the investment rate, the variables they identified as
robust were the initial level of per capita GDP, population growth and the
level of schooling (as measured by the ratio of secondary school enrollment).
In addition to these, Bleaney (1996) includes the growth rate of the exports
to GDP ratio as a control variable. He excludes the ratio of secondary school
enrollment, because it appears as insignificant in his regression.
Including the variables identified as robust by Levine and Renelt (1992)
can also be justified from a theoretical point of view, in the sense that outside
of the steady state (and with no technological growth), these are proxies for
the factors that will determine the growth rate in a Solow model, in the short
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term. Bleaney (1996) does not go into why he includes the growth rate of
the exports to GDP ratio as a control variable, but one obvious reason for
including it is that changes in foreign demand causes an increase in the price
of exports, which automatically will lead to an increase in GDP.
Bleaney (1996) uses a similar framework to test the impact of macroeco-
nomic instability on investments:
INVi “ δ ` Viφ`Ziρ` ηi (3.2)
Where Z is the same vector of indicators of macroeconomic stability as in
eq. (3.1), V is a vector of control variables and δ is a constant. Levine
and Renelt (1992) also tested the robustness of different variables that were
proposed as being conducive to investment. The only variable they identified
as robust was the exports to GDP ratio as a measure of openness. In addition
to using the initial ratio of exports to GDP, Bleaney (1996) uses the average
growth rate of the exports/GDP ratio as well as the index of real exchange
rate distortion calculated by Dollar (1992) for the period 1976-85.
3.2 Extending the analysis
Due to lack of data on real exchange rate distortion in the 1990s and 2000s, I
have not included this variable in any other regressions than the replication
of Bleaney (1996). Other than that, I have used the same control variables as
Bleaney (1996) in all of the regressions in this paper. As a measure of human
capital, I attempted to include the average attended years of education in the
regressions. Strictly speaking, a measure of growth in human capital would
be more in line with the neoclassical model, but education might also be
thought of as a factor that drives technological growth. When time dummies
were not included in the panel regressions, this variable appeared as very
significant, but when dummies for the 1990s and 2000s were included, this
effect disappeared. This is most likely because there is an upward sloping
trend in years of education for almost all countries, combined with the fact
that the average growth rate for the countries in my sample is higher in the
1990s than in the 1980s, and higher in the 2000s than in the 1990s. So that
the education variable only picked up this upward sloping trend in growth
for developing countries. The results for the variables of interest were not
sensitive to whether I included it or not. This, and also because I did not
have available data on education for all the countries, led me to not include
it as a control variable.
The first extension I will do is to include more countries to the regression.
I include all countries that were defined as developing countries by the IMF
in 1980 for which there is available data, and do three separate regressions;
for 1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-2009 (section 5.2). These are cross section
analyses with the average values for each decade. I also do a pooled ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression with up to three observations per country (one
per decade).
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I will then turn to the major methodological improvement, compared with
Bleaney’s analysis. I will exploit the fact that I have data on the same
countries for three decades,2 by doing a fixed effect panel regression (section
5.3), using the following framework:
GRit “ α ` ψINVit `Xitβ `Zitγ ` dt ` ai ` it (3.3)
INVit “ δ ` Vitφ`Zitρ` dt ` bi ` ηit (3.4)
Where the GR, INV ,X, V and Z are as defined above, and the subscript
it denotes that this is the observation for country i in time period t. The
variable dt is a time dummy (one for each period except the first) to capture
time trends, while ai and bi are time constant country specific effects that
affect growth and investment. These country specific effects can be anything
not included in the regression that affects growth equally for all the time
periods. For instance we might expect institutional environment or some
cultural aspects to have an impact on growth. These variables are typically
relatively persistent over time within a country. When doing a standard cross
section regression, it is not possible to control for this country specific effect
unless we have some kind of measure for it. When doing a panel regression,
however, the mean for a country is subtracted on both sides of the equations
such that the country specific effect is controlled for:
GRit ´ĚGRi “ ψpINVit ´ ĘINV iq ` pXit ´ X¯iqβ ` pZit ´ Z¯iqγ ` it ´ ¯i
(3.5)
The most serious problem with OLS arises when the country specific effect
is correlated with the regressors included in the regression. This causes the
estimated coefficients to be biased. If for example high institutional quality3
is positively correlated with both growth and the central government budget
surplus, the estimate for the coefficient of the budget surplus will be upward
biased. This means that our estimate would suggest that a positive budget
surplus contributes more to economic growth than it really does. When doing
a fixed effect regression, however, this effect is controlled for. If there are
country specific effects that are not constant over time and these are correlated
with growth and the included regressors, there would still be a problem of
omitted variable bias. Unless proxies for these variables or valid instruments
for the included regressors can be found, there is not much to do about
this problem, and there is no way to find out if the problem really exists.
However, a fixed effect panel regression is still an improvement compared to
a cross section regression.
My panel is an unbalanced panel, which means that I do not have obser-
vations for all countries in each decade. This will only cause biased estimates
2 I don’t have observations for all countries in all decades, so it will be an unbalanced panel.
3 The macroeconomic management are also handled by some institutions. However, this is not
what I mean when talking about institutional quality. By institutional quality I mean the degree
of rule of law, protection of private property rights and degree of democracy or other deep and
persisting institutions in society.
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if there is a systematic reason for the variables to be unobserved that cor-
relates with both groth and the regressors. I have not been able to detect
such systematic explanations to why data is missing for countries, but it is
not impossible that there is one. However, if i were to use a balanced panel, I
would be left with very few observations. To see which countries are included
in which decade, see Tab. 10 in Appendix B.
When doing growth analyses based on panel regressions there is a dilemma
between setting the time period short to get as many observations as possible,
and keeping the periods long enough to measure what you want to measure.
Having many observations is good to make more accurate estimates, by keep-
ing the standard errors down. But if I want to say something about how
macroeconomic management affects growth in the long term, I cannot base
the regression on, say, 3-year averages. Short period growth rates will be
heavily influenced by short term macroeconomic fluctuations. I have cho-
sen to base the regression on 10-year averages. This is long enough to not
be very biased by cyclical fluctuations but short enough to give me enough
observations to keep the standard errors down.
3.3 Endogeniety of the investment rate
As mentioned in section 2.2 it might be argued that the investment rate
depends on the actual or expected growth rate of GDP. If this is the case,
the model will be misspecified and the estimates suffer from a simultaneity
bias. Bleaney mentiones this possibility (in a footnote), but states that "the
existence of simultaneous equation bias was rejected in a Hausman test, and
the equations were estimated by OLS." (Bleaney, 1996, p. 469). He is not
explicit about what instruments he used to perform the test, but if he based
the test on the basic growth equation, the possible instruments are population
growth and initial GDP. These variables have very low explanatory power for
growth (R2 “ 0.04), and according to Hahn et al. (2011) this causes the
Hausman test to be invalid. Unless we find stronger instruments for growth,
there is no way we can be sure that growth is exogenous to the investment
rate. In the absence of good instruments it is also impossible to consistently
estimate the equations in a simultaneous equation system.
Even though I find it little convincing that the investment rate is exoge-
nous to growth, I have not been able to find good instruments, or in other
sophisticated ways estimate these equations consistently. Doing so would be a
methodological improvement, but it is simply too time consuming to be pos-
sible in this thesis. I will therefore stick to the framework used by Bleaney
(1996), extended by panel regressions.
4. MEASURING THE QUALITY OF MACROECONOMIC
MANAGEMENT
In order to assess the effect of macroeconomic management on economic
growth it is necessary to find a convincing measure of how well countries
handle their macroeconomic management. By good macroeconomic manage-
ment I mean an economy where the government manages to provide a stable
macroeconomic environment, as defined in chapter 2.
Kormendi and Meguire (1985) were among the first to include macroeco-
nomic policy variables in growth regressions. They found that the standard
deviation of unanticipated monetary growth was significantly negatively cor-
related with growth in GDP for a sample of 47 countries over the period
1950-77.
Both Cottani et al. (1990) and Dollar (1992) find real exchange rate vari-
ability to be significantly negatively correlated to growth, and Cottani et al.
(1990) also concludes that it is negatively correlated with investments. Ghura
and Grennes (1993) finds real exchange rate instability to be significantly
negatively correlated with investments, but not with growth, in a study of 33
sub-Saharan African countries.
Fischer (1993) uses the inflation rate, the central government budget sur-
plus/deficit and the black market exchange rate premium as indicators of the
quality of the macroeconomic management. He argues that the inflation rate
is the best indicator of how well a country manages its economy. It is widely
accepted that very high inflation rates inhibit an efficient resource allocation
and depress investment rates (Fischer, 1993, p. 487). Even though most
countries aim for a positive inflation rate, there are no good arguments for
very high inflation rates. Therefore high inflation rates may be interpreted
as an indication that the government has lost control over the economy.
Some countries manage to keep the inflation rate low and stable for a
long time, in an unsustainable way, for example by pegging their currency
to a major currency who’s economy is in a completely different situation.
According to Fischer (1993, p. 487) these countries will most likely face fiscal
or balance of payments problems, and the central government budget surplus
or deficit will be a good indicator of such an unsustainable situation. As a
measure of the sustainability and appropriateness of the exchange rate, he
uses the black market exchange rate premium.
Bleaney (1996) chose to focus on four concepts; the inflation rate, the
stability of the real exchange rate, the budget balance and the (external) gov-
ernment debt. More specifically, he used the five following indicators:
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BS - the central government budget surplus (including grants) as percentage
of GDP.
SDRER - the standard deviation of the logarithm of the real exchange rate.4
CPINFL - average consumer price inflation over the period 1980-90 (value
set to 100 % if average inflation exceeded that level).
DEBT79 - ratio of end-1979 foreign debt5 to 1979 export revenues.
HIC - a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country was classified as a highly
indebted country by the World Bank in 1989, and 0 otherwise.6
In theory it is primarily variability and thus uncertainty in the inflation
rate that inhibits growth (see chapter 2), and ideally the variability of the
inflation rate would be a good measure for this. In practice the variance and
mean values of the inflation rates are so highly correlated (see Tab. 1), that
it is hard to distinguish the effects from one another in a regression. Bleaney
(1996) therefore chooses to look at average inflation, and not the standard
deviation.




In his sample, there are some countries that experienced extremely high
inflation rates in some years. In order to avoid that these few observations
determine the coefficient estimate, a maximum of 100 % was imposed on the
average inflation rate (Bleaney, 1996, p. 466).
Bleaney (1996, p. 466) argues that the central government budget sur-
plus/deficit as percentage of GDP serves as a measure of the quality of fiscal
management. Though Keynesians would argue that running a deficit during
periods of economic stagnation is a good way to stimulate the economy and
thus create macroeconomic stability, this argument does not hold when look-
ing at an 11-year average. The initial level of government debt essentially
measures the same thing as the budget surplus, but it measures how fiscal
policy was handled in the past rather than at the present.
Bleaney (1996) uses the standard deviation of the logarithm of the real
effective exchange rate as a measure of the variability of the real exchange
rate. Understanding how to interpret this variable is important in order to
assess its importance for growth, when looking at the size of its coefficient
4 Where it was possible it was calculated from the real effective exchange rate as published in
IMF International Financial Statistics, and otherwise from the bilateral consumer price based rate
against the US dollar.
5 Government debt to foreign creditors.
6 In this sample these were: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Morocco,
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bulow and Rogoff, 1990, p. 31).
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estimates in chapter 5. Since this is only to get a vague idea about what the
value of the variable means, we can think of the standard deviation as the
average deviation from the mean:
SDRER “ sdplnpRERqq «
řT
t“1 lnpRERtq ´ lnpĘRERq
T
And since lnpRERtq ´ lnpĘRERq « RERt´ĞRERĞRER , we can think of SDRER as
approximately the real exchange rate’s average relative deviation from its
mean, i.e. SDRER=0.1 means that the real exchange rate had an average
relative deviation from its mean of approximately 10 %. This sure is a measure
of the predictability of the exchange rate, but it does not measure if the
exchange rate is competitive or appropriate. If he also wanted to test this,
he could use the black market premium, as in Fischer (1993). However I did
not find easily available data for enough countries to include this variable.
I have chosen to use the same indicators as Bleaney (1996), with some
small differences. Due to lack of available data on foreign debt, I have chosen
to use total government debt as percentage of GDP instead of foreign debt
as percentage of exports. Except from the regression where I replicate his
results, I will not use the HIC dummy. This is because the World Bank does
not have a list of countries classified as "highly indebted countries" anymore.
Instead the World Bank, together with the IMF, have classified a number of
countries as "highly indebted poor countries" (HIPC), which means that in
addition to being highly indebted, a country also has to be sufficiently poor
to be labeled a HIPC. Including a HIPC dummy as a regressor would have
caused serious exogeneity problems, because being a poor country is a result
of having low growth. However the already included debt to GDP ratio is a
good measure of how highly indebted the country is, so another measure of
this is not really needed. The variables for inflation rate, budget surplus and
exchange rate variability are constructed in the exact same way as in Bleaney
(1996):
BS - the central government budget surplus (including grants) as percentage
of GDP.
SDRER - the standard deviation of the logarithm of the real exchange rate.7
CPinf - average consumer price inflation over the period 1980-90 (value set
to 100 % if average inflation exceeded that level).
debtX9 - ratio of end-1979 central government debt to 1979 GDP, for the
1980s, and the same ratio for 1989 and 1999 for respectively the 1990s
and 2000s.
7 Where it was possible it was calculated from the real effective exchange rate as published in
IMF International Financial Statistics, and otherwise from the bilateral consumer price based rate
against the US dollar.
5. RESULTS
For some of the variables I used data from some other sources than Bleaney
(1996) did (see Appendix A for description of variables and data sources), and
for many developing countries the numbers tend to vary depending on the
source. Therefore I find it useful to do a replication of Bleaney (1996), using
the exact same countries and almost the same variables. As mentioned, I was
not able to access data on foreign debt for all the countries, so I used the
total central government debt as percentage of GDP, instead of the foreign
debt to exports ratio.
As basis for the growth regressions, Bleaney (1996) uses population growth,
investment rate, growth in exports to GDP ratio and population growth con-












Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics. GR is the average annual per capita GDP growth rate,
LGR is average annual population growth rate, INV is the investment/GDP ratio, XYGR is the
growth rate of the exports/GDP ratio and LYPC79 is log GDP per capita in 1979 (measured in
USD).
His results for the coefficients of interest are shown in Tab. 2. The countries
included in the regressions are those developing countries for which data were
available (in his sources at that time).8
Except for the coefficient of the inflation rate in column (2), all the es-
timates in the growth regressions have the expected sign. A higher budget
surplus seems to be associated with a higher growth rate, while a higher
real exchange rate volatility is associated with a lower growth rate. None
of the estimated coefficients on the variables of interest are actually signifi-
cantly different from zero at a five percent significance level,9 but the budget
surplus/GDP ratio as well as the standard deviation of the (log) real ex-
change rate (in column (2)) have p-values just above 0.05. Bleaney (1996)
also runs an F-test of the hypothesis that all coefficients of interest (for the
Z-variables) are zero (results are reported at the bottom of the table). As
8 The countries included where: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, India, Iran, Israel,
Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
9 The critical t-value for column (2) is 2.0345 (df “ 41´ 8 “ 33)
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Tab. 2: The original results in Bleaney (1996)
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: PCGR PCGR PCGR INV INV INV 
Coefficient of 
BS 0.155 0.164 0.386 0.337 0.362 
(1.78) (2.01) (1.52) (1.45) (1.54) 
SDRER (X 10- 2 ) -4.42 -6.91 -8.86 -1.90 -10.08 
( - 1.29) ( - 2.03) ( -0.89) (-0.19) ( - 1.35) 
CPINFL (X 10- 4 ) -0.501 0.399 -1.96 -0.584 
( -0.36) (0.33) ( -0.47) (-0.14) 
DEB179 ( X 10- 2 ) -0.145 0.273 
( -0.75) (0.50) 
HIC -0.043 -3.65 
(-0.05) ( - 1.75) 
INV* BS 0.631 
(1.95) 
INV* SDRER (X 10- 2 ) -2.39 
( - 1.45) 
INV* PINFL (X 10- 4 ) -0.441 
( -0.60) 
INV* DEB179 ( X 10- 2 ) -0.588 
(-0.69) 
F-statistic 2.29 1.94 3.55 0.88 1.66 1.62 
[marginal significance] [0.08] [0.13] [0.02] [0.49] [0.18] [0.21] 
n 40 41 40 39 39 39 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Additional regressors included are those shown in preferred regres-
sions given in the text. PCGR - average annual per capita GDP growth rate; INV - investment/GDP
ratio; BS - average central government budget surplus (% GDP); SDRER - standard deviation of log(real
exchange rate); CPINFL - average annual inflation rate (truncated at 100%); DEBT79 - ratio of external
debt to exports in 1979; HIC - dummy variable = 1 for highly indebted country in 1989. F-statistic is a
test of the hypothesis that coefficients of regressors shown are jointly zero.
Source: Bleaney (1996)
we see, the hypothesis is rejected at a 10 % significance level for two of the
growth regressions. This is a fairly strong indication that there actually is a
relationship between these four indicators of macroeconomic (in)stability and
economic growth.
I will come back to the issue of economic significance in chapter 6, but
it’s worth to take a look at the size of the coefficient estimates for BS and
SDRER. If we use the estimates in column (2), we see that a decrease in
the average budget deficit (increase in the average budget surplus) with one
percentage point of GDP is associated with an increase of 0.164 percentage
points in the average growth rate. Put differently, an increase in average
budget surplus of six percentage points of GDP is associated with an increase
of one percentage point in average growth rate.
Interpreting the coefficient of SDRER is a bit harder. Recall that if we
interpret the standard deviation as roughly the average deviation from the
mean, and remember that the difference between the logarithm of two values
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is approximately the relative change in the value, we can interpret SDRER
as the real exchange rate’s average relative deviation from its mean. To
make it clearer; a one unit increase in SDRER means that the real exchange
rate’s average relative deviation from its mean increases by 100 percentage
points. The estimate tells us that an increase in the standard deviation of
the real exchange rate by 1 is associated with a 6.9 percentage point decrease
in the average growth rate.10 Or put differently, that an increase in the real
exchange rate’s average relative deviation from its mean by 10 percentage
points is associated with a 0.69 percentage points drop in growth rate. Taken
into account that 95 percent of the observations in my sample has a value of
SDRER of 0.36 or below (the values range from 0.01 to 3.9511), a change of
0.1 is quite a large change. But for countries with very high real exchange
rate volatility, there might be a lot to gain from reducing this volatility, if the
point estimate should be taken seriously.
With regard to the theory discussed in chapter 2, one of the most interest-
ing findings is that when the investment rate is controlled for, macroeconomic
stability seems to matter for economic growth, but it is far less clear that it
matters for investments. I will discuss possible explanations for this in chap-
ter 6.
5.1 Replication of Bleaney (1996)
In this section I will use the same method and the same countries as Bleaney
(1996), but not all my data are from the same sources as his. As mentioned
in chapter 4, Bleaney uses the foreign debt of the central government as
percentage of exports whereas I use the total central government debt as
percentage of GDP. Other than that, all variables are constructed in the
same way.
The estimated coefficients on the control variables are, with one exception,











Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics. The variables are the same as above
The coefficient estimate of the impact of population growth on per capita
GDP growth, is considerably larger here than in Bleaney (1996). I have tried
population data from several different databases12 and they all yield more or
less the same result. Given that the other coefficient estimates are similar
to the ones in Bleaney (1996), the most plausible explanation is that he had
poor data on population growth.13
10 The rates are expressed in decimals, so the coefficient of SDRER must be multiplied by 100.
11 There are only two observations in my sample with values of SDRER above one. Excluding
these from the sample has no significant effect on any of the estimates.
12 The World Bank’s WDI, IMF’s IFS and Penn World Table.
13 I have been in touch with Prof. Bleaney, and he confirms that I have constructed the variables
correctly, but he no longer has the dataset, so it is hard to find out what causes this difference.
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Tab. 3: OLS same countries as Bleaney 1980-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GR GR GR INV INV INV
BS 0.210** 0.211** 0.257 0.314 0.325
(2.46) (2.44) (1.12) (1.35) (1.44)
SDRER -0.0868** -0.0701* -0.0941 -0.0104 -0.0887
(-2.44) (-1.84) (-0.99) (-0.10) (-1.04)
CPinf 0.00195 0.00417 -0.00801 0.00362













F-statistic 2.750 2.501 3.552 1.363 1.052 1.181
p-value 0.0451 0.0620 0.0166 0.269 0.396 0.319
N 41 41 41 40 40 40
t statistics in parentheses
* p ă 0.10, ** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01
GR, INV, BS, SDRER, CPinf and HIC are as described above, while debtX9 is the ratio of
central government debt to GDP in 1979. F-statistic is a test of the hypothesis that coefficients
of regressors shown are jointly zero, while "p-value" is the corresponding p-value.
The results for the variables of interest are shown in Tab. 3. I will only
briefly comment on the differences between mine and Bleaney’s results in
this section. Focusing first on the growth regressions (columns (1)-(3)), the
coefficient estimates and t-values are slightly higher for BS and INVxBS in
my regressions than in Bleaney (1996). The estimates for the coefficient of
SDRER are similar to Bleaney (1996), at least in column (2). The estimates
for CPinf, debt79 and HIC are close to zero, and have such large standard
errors in both the replication and in Bleaney (1996) that it is hard to compare
their values.
When looking at the investment regressions (columns (4)-(6)), the stan-
dard errors are so large that it is hard to compare the point estimates, except
for the coefficient estimates of BS and HIC. The estimate of the budget sur-
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plus coefficient is more or less the same, while the HIC coefficient estimate
is much lower in the replication than in Bleaney (1996).
By looking at the joint significance tests, we see the same observation as
in Bleaney (1996), namely that it seems like there is a relationship between
the indicators of macroeconomic stability and per capita GDP growth, but
there is no evidence that there is a relationship between these indicators and
the investment rate.
5.2 Adding more countries, and looking at the 1990s and 2000s
In this first step of the extended analysis I added more countries, to see if the
results change when the sample is expanded. In this section I have included
all developing countries for which there was sufficient available data. The
variables BS, CPinf and debtX9 were the critical ones with respect to data
availability. Data on initial central government debt is only observed once per
decade, so it is either available or not, but BS and CPinf are decade averages.
In cases where there were only a few observations of these variables, the
decade mean would be very inaccurate. However, if I only used the countries
where I had available data for the whole decade, I would be left with too few
observations. I therefore chose to drop the observation if there were more
than three missing observations for those variables in a decade.14 A list of
included countries in the different regressions of this section can be found in
Tab. 10 in Appendix B.
Tab. 4: Three separate OLS regressions for 1980s (1) 1990s (2) and 2000s (3), and pooled
OLS for 1980-2009 (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GR GR GR GR
BS 0.171* 0.112 -0.0289 0.111**
(2.02) (1.24) (-0.33) (2.36)
SDRER -0.00540 -0.0224 0.0187 -0.00448
(-0.80) (-0.72) (1.28) (-0.95)
CPinf -0.00437 -0.00798 -0.0326 -0.0133**
(-0.35) (-0.79) (-1.44) (-2.00)
debtX9 -0.00563 0.000779 0.000436 -0.00119
(-0.41) (0.15) (0.11) (-0.40)
F-statistic 3.081 0.658 0.683 4.224
p-value 0.0283 0.625 0.606 0.00284
N 44 52 70 166
t statistics in parentheses
* p ă 0.10, ** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01
Estimates of the coefficients of the control variables can be found in Tab. 8.
14 Therefore Belize, Dominican Republic and Tunisia were not included in the regression reported
in Tab. 4 (1), even though they were included in the previous section.
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The results for the years 1980-89 are shown in Tab. 4 (1). We see two
noticeable differences between this and the results in the previous section. The
coefficient of BS is somewhat lower, and the coefficient of SDRER is much
lower and insignificant. I will investigate this result further in section 6.1.
The coefficients for inflation and initial government debt remain low and
insignificant. What is also worth noticing is that the hypothesis that all of
them are zero is rejected at a very low level of significance (p-value of 0.02).
This strengthens the hypothesis that macroeconomic stability matters for
growth.
When looking at the results for the 1990s (column (2)), we see that the
coefficient of the budget surplus is even lower and insignificant. None of the
variables seems to be significant alone, and even the joint significance test
cannot reject the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero.
The results for the 2000s in column (3) differ from the 1980s in many in-
teresting aspects. Firstly the estimate of the coefficient of the inflation rate is
notably larger (in absolute value) and its t-value is also higher. Secondly the
coefficient of SDRER is positive, which is the opposite of what we would ex-
pect from theory, but still statistically insignificant. The coefficient estimate
of the budget surplus is very close to zero (even negative) and statistically
insignificant. Why this estimate differs so much from the others will also be
discussed in section 6.1. To test if any of the coefficient estimates for the 1990s
and 2000s were significantly different from the estimates for the 1980s, I ran
a pooled OLS regression with dummies for the 1990s and 2000s multiplied
with each of the regressors. The results showed that none of the estimates
were significantly different from each other at a five percent significance level.
Another thing worth noticing is that the joint hypothesis test does not reject
the hypothesis that all coefficients equal zero.
Column (4) shows the results from a pooled OLS regression, with dummies
for the 1990s and 2000s, to control for time trends. The coefficient of the
inflation rate is negative and significant at a five percent level, but the impact
seems to be very small. The coefficient of the budget surplus is lower than
in the 1980s regression, but still statistically significant. I will come back
to discussing this finding in section 6.1. What is also worth noticing is that
although the joint significance tests for the 1990s and 2000s do not reject the
hypothesis that all coefficients are zero, it is rejected at a very low significance
for the pooled OLS regression.
In this section I have expanded the analyses of section 5.1 and in Bleaney
(1996) and looked at each decade separately. I have not taken advantage of
the panel structure of the data, in order to control for time constant country
specific effects. This is the topic for the next section.
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5.3 Panel regression
To be able to control for time constant country fixed effects like institutional
quality or cultural differences, I ran fixed effects panel regressions. The results
of these regressions are shown in Tab. 5. There are several interesting things
Tab. 5: GDP per capita growth and investment on indicators of macroeconomic stability (panel
regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GR GR GR INV INV
BS 0.0202 0.0435 0.371 0.309
(0.27) (0.52) (1.37) (1.22)
SDRER -0.00316 -0.00328 -0.00339 -0.000919
(-0.55) (-0.57) (-0.16) (-0.05)
CPinf -0.0272*** -0.0202** 0.00402 -0.00716











F-statistic 5.134 3.076 3.727 0.736 0.720
p-value 0.00275 0.0217 0.00842 0.570 0.543
N 174 166 166 164 170
t statistics in parentheses
* p ă 0.10, ** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01
Estimates of the coefficients of the control variables can be found in Tab. 9.
worth noticing about the results of the growth regressions (column (1)-(3)). In
the growth regressions, the central government budget surplus seems to have
no effect on growth. The coefficient estimates are close to zero, and so are the
t-values. This is in stark contrast to the findings of Bleaney (1996), where
the budget surplus seems to be the most significant variable. The estimate of
real exchange rate volatility coefficient is close to zero and insignificant. This
is also very different from the results in Bleaney (1996), where it appeared as
statistically significant and of a size that suggested an economically significant
impact on the growth rate, at least for countries with high real exchange rate
volatility.
The inflation rate appears as statistically significant, with a coefficient
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estimate of around ´0.02 (in column (2)). This tells us that an increase in
the inflation rate by one percentage point is associated with a 0.02 percentage
points decrease in the growth rate. Or equivalently that a decrease in the
inflation rate by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.2 percentage
points increase in growth rate. This is much higher than the estimates in
Bleaney (1996), but it is still not enough to be regarded as economically
significant.
While the government debt to GDP ratio seems to be statistically signifi-
cant at a 10 percent significance level, the coefficient estimate is so small that
it can be regarded as economically insignificant.
In Bleaney (1996) and in section 5.1, the specification where the Z vari-
ables are multiplied with the investment rate (3) fits the data marginally
better (the F-values are higher). Bleaney interprets this as an indication that
"the impact of macroeconomic instability falls mainly on the quality of the
capital stock" (Bleaney, 1996, p. 471). By the quality of an investment, he
means the return to the investment. A more stable macroeconomic environ-
ment makes it easier to predict future demand and future earnings, thus it
is more likely that the investment will ensure an allocation of resources that
maximizes the value of production. The results in section 5.1 indicate the
same, but this is far less clear in the panel regression.
When looking at the investment regressions in the two last columns of
Tab. 5, we see that the only variable that is somewhere close to significant is
the central government budget surplus as percentage of GDP. It is important
to keep in mind that budget deficits need to be financed through borrowing.
The negative effect that budget deficits (maybe) have on the investment rate,
might therefore be a result of a crowding out effect (see chapter 2).
Before moving on to discussing these findings, it is worth taking a look
at the joint significance tests. By looking at the F-statistics for the growth
regressions, we see that the hypothesis that the coefficients of all the regres-
sors of interest are zero is rejected at every reasonable level of significance.
However, this is not the case for the investment regressions. This is the same
result as in Bleaney (1996), and can be interpreted to strengthen the hypoth-
esis that macroeconomic stability affects growth through other channels than
the investment channel. Although the evidence for statistical significance
seems very strong, none of the indicators of macroeconomic stability seem to
have an impact on growth that is large enough to be regarded as economically
significant.
6. DISCUSSION
After expanding Bleaney’s (1996) analysis, first by adding more observations
and then by performing a panel regression, there are a few interesting findings
that deserve some discussion. I will keep the discussion mainly to the growth
regressions, since the investment regressions do not differ that much and since
I do not have enough control variables in those regressions for the results to
be very reliable.
To start at the general level, the joint significance tests indicate that there
is a relationship between the indicators of macroeconomic (mis)management
and growth. In the panel regression, the hypothesis that all the coefficients of
the Z variables are zero, is rejected at every reasonable level of significance.
This is confirmed in section 5.2 by looking at the regression for the 1980s and
the pooled OLS regression. However, it is not rejected in the regressions for
the 1990s and the 2000s.
A second interesting finding is that the coefficient of the budget surplus,
which is relatively large and significant in the 1980s regression, is very low
and insignificant in the OLS regressions for the other decades as well as in
the panel regression. It turns out that this can probably be explained by the
fact that one single outlier with extraordinary high values on both budget
surplus and growth in the 1980s is responsible for the size and significance of
the coefficient. I will look into the issue of outliers in section 6.1.
A third thing worth noticing is that the coefficient on inflation has the
expected sign in all specifications in the panel regression. It is also alot larger
than in Bleaney (1996), and it is significant on a five percent level. This
might be interpreted as an argument in favour of the hypothesis that high
inflation inhibits growth, but it might also be a result of a spurious effect, as
I will discuss in section 6.2. Although it is statistically significant, it does not
seem to be economically significant. However, this might be a result of the
way the equation is specified. I will look further into this in section 6.3.
Also the initial government debt as percentage of GDP seems to be neg-
atively associated with economic growth, but the estimated coefficient is so
low that huge reductions in the debt level are associated with very small im-
provements in the growth rate. As with the investment rate, this might also
be a result of the specification of the equation (see section 6.3).
After this extended analysis it is a somewhat confusing result that re-
mains. When looking at the results from the panel regression (Tab. 5), the
statistical significance is stronger than what was demonstrated in Bleaney
(1996), but the economic significance is weaker. The results from the panel
regression strongly support the hypothesis that there exists a relationship
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between macroeconomic stability and growth, yet the size of the coefficients
are so small that it seems like very large improvements in the indicators of
macroeconomic stability are associated with small increases in growth rates.
The main reason for this is that the results from the panel regression do
not support the hypothesis that a lower budget deficit is associated with a
higher growth rate. Nor do they support the hypothesis that real exchange
rate volatility inhibits growth. These were the most significant (statistically
and economic) variables in Bleaney’s analysis. The only two Z variables that
appear to be associated with growth are the inflation rate and the initial
government debt. And though they seem to be statistically significant, it
seems like their impact on growth is so small that even large improvements
in these are associated with moderate improvements in growth rate, but as
mentioned, this may be a result of how the model is specified.
Before I discuss potential problems with the results in the panel regression
I will discuss the concept of outliers, and look into how single outliers are
driving the results in Bleaney (1996), and can explain some of the differences
between the result in the panel regression and the cross section regressions in
section 5.1.
6.1 Outliers
An outlier is an observation that does not seem to follow the pattern of the
other data points. When doing OLS regressions with small samples, one has
to be aware of the effect an outlier has on the estimates. The same is true
for true for panel regressions, since it is only a modified form of OLS. The
danger is that the outlier causes a bias in the coefficient estimate:
[A] large error when squared becomes very large, so when mini-
mizing the sum of squared errors OLS gives a high weight to this
observation, causing the OLS estimating line to swing towards this
observation, masking the fact that it is an outlier.
(Kennedy, 2009, p. 346).
This problem will be especially severe in small samples, like the ones used in
this paper.
To investigate whether there are outliers that are causing large biases in
my results the first task would be to identify the outliers. To do this for the
OLS regressions, I plotted the estimated residuals against each variable of
interest, to see if any of the observation differed much from the others. As
shown in Fig. 3, there is one country that has an average government budget
surplus way above the other countries, that also has a high estimated residual,
namely Botswana.
The next step would be to run the regression again without Botswana in
the sample. The results of this regression are shown in Tab. 6 (1). As we
see, the estimate of the coefficient of the budget surplus is less than half of
what it was in Tab. 3, and it is no longer significant. The same happens in
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Fig. 3: Botswana as an outlier in the Bleaney (1996) replication
the pooled OLS regression (in Tab. 4) when Botswana is excluded. This is
a clear indication that the result Bleaney (1996) found with respect to this
variable is not very robust.














t statistics in parentheses
* p ă 0.10, ** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01
(1) shows how the results from the Bleaney (1996) replication (Tab 3 (1)) change when Botswana
is excluded, while (2) shows how the results change when Israel is excluded.
What is so special about Botswana? In the early 1970s the South African
company De Beers discovered diamonds in northern Botswana. In 1975, when
the government discovered how productive the diamond mines were, they
managed to negotiate a mining agreement with De Beers that gave the gov-
ernment a 50 percent share of diamond profits. The discovery of diamonds
have been driving economic growth in Botswana since then, and is one of the
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reasons why Botswana has been among the fastest growing countries for the
last 40 years. Due to the mining deal it has also contributed to giving the
government high budget surpluses (Acemoglu et al., 2002).
This is a clear example of an omitted variable (the presence of diamonds)
that affects both the budget surplus and the growth rate, and causes a bias
in the estimates. It also demonstrates how vulnerable regressions with few
observations are to outliers like Botswana.
Looking at the residual plots may be a subjective way of finding potential
outliers. It may also be hard to spot them, because the process of minimizing
squared residuals makes sure that the residuals are not so large. A more
systematic way of investigating this problem, is to run the regression n times
where observation i is excluded from the sample, one at a time (Kennedy,
2009, p. 346–347). I used this method to control for outliers in all of the
regressions in chapter 5. In addition to Botswana’s effect on the coefficient
of the budget surplus, there was one other country that seemed to have a
severe impact on an estimate, namely Israel. When Israel was excluded from
the sample, the coefficient of SDRER became much smaller and insignificant
(see Tab. 6 (2)).
Israel had a relatively stable real exchange rate in the 1980s despite very
high inflation in the start of the decade. They had a relatively low investment
rate, high initial GDP per capita and a negative growth in the exports/GDP
ratio. These are all factors that are associated with a low growth rate in my
regressions, yet Israel had an average annual growth rate of 2 percent for the
years 1980-1990. An explanation to why Israel seems to be driving the result
can be that it scores high on some omitted variable, like institutional quality,
that contributes to a higher growth rate, but since it also had a stable real
exchange rate it becomes an outlier that biases the estimate of the coefficient
of SDRER.
We have seen that excluding some outliers may change the results dramat-
ically. But are these results more reliable than the ones where the outliers
are included? If the reason the outlier observations are outliers is because
of measurement errors, the answer is clearly yes. If not, then it is less clear
what to do about them (Kennedy, 2009, p. 346–347). They may be outliers
because they simply do not fit the model. So excluding them would make the
model fit better to the data. However I will argue that this is not likely to be
the case here.
Excluding Botswana in the Bleaney (1996) replication does not make the
model fit the data better. On the contrary, we see that this single observation
was the reason why the budget surplus coefficient seemed to be statistically
significant. The same can be said about Israel and the real exchange rate
volatility coefficient.
The fact that the results for BS and SDRER are so sensitive to one single
observation casts doubt on the robustness of the result. The observation
that when including more data and controlling for country fixed effect, the
estimates turns out as insignificant, shows that we have good reason to doubt
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these findings in Bleaney (1996).
The fact that the effect of the budget surplus disappeared when going from
a pooled OLS regression to a fixed effects panel regression also highlights the
difference between these two estimation methods. While the pooled OLS es-
timates suffer from an omitted variable bias, the fixed effects method corrects
for the biases of time constant country specific effects like diamond produc-
tion.
This is not to conclude that a viable fiscal policy and stability in the real
exchange rate has no impact on growth, but that there is no econometric
evidence that it does. I will discuss why there might be effects that we are
unable to detect in section 6.5.
6.2 Endogeneity problems
One of the most serious problems about growth regressions that use macro
variables as regressors, like the ones in this paper, is that the exogeneity
assumption underlying the analysis is unlikely to hold. It is not hard to argue
that almost all of the regressors I have used depend on omitted variables that
also affect growth, or that they depend on growth themselves. The list of
omitted variables that might have caused biases or explanations to why the
variables are subject to reverse causality is long, and I will not attempt to list
all of them here. However, I will discuss some of the most obvious candidates
and try to asses how likely it is that my estimates are biased by them.
I will start by focusing on a possible omitted variable bias that affects the
coefficient of the inflation rate. According to Fischer (1993, p. 489), a negative
supply shock will cause both GDP and inflation to fall. The reasoning behind
this argument is an AS-AD model, where supply and demand depend on the
price level. As shown in figure 4 (a), a negative supply shock will cause
Fig. 4: Negative supply and demand shocks in an AS-AD model














an inward shift in the aggregate supply curve, and thus cause a contraction
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in GDP and an increase in the price level. However, a negative demand
shock would cause a contraction in GDP and a decrease in the price level
(see Fig. 4 (b)). If these kinds of shocks have large impacts on 10 year
average growth and inflation rates, which way they bias the coefficient depend
on whether supply shocks or demand shocks are most common. If demand
shocks are most common, it might be that my estimate on the coefficient
of the inflation rate is upward biased (too low in absolute value). However,
unless these shocks are very large and persistent, it is not very likely that
they contribute to any large biases.
Due to the way the real exchange variable is constructed (R “ P˚E
P
) a high
inflation rate will automatically cause the real exchange rate to appreciate.
This might be offset by a nominal depreciation, but in practice (at least
in my dataset) we see that the correlation between inflation rate and real
exchange rate volatility is high, which is an indication that these usually do
not perfectly offset each other. This means that if the presence of supply
or demand shocks biase the coefficient estimates of the inflation rate, it will
also bias the SDRER coefficient estimate. While positive and negative shocks
have opposite effects on the growth rate, they will both contribute to a higher
exchange rate volatility. Hence, whether it is upward or downward biased
depends on whether positive or negative supply and demand shocks are most
common. However, since the coefficient estimate is so low and insignificant,
I will not spend more time discussing this possibility.
The government debt to GDP ratio will naturally depend on the size of
GDP and thus the growth rate. This is the reason why I have used the
initial level, meaning the year before the decade started. There is no way
that growth in the 1980s could affect the ratio of government debt to GDP
in 1979. However, a low growth rate in the 1970s may have contributed to a
large debt to GDP ratio in 1979. This is both because it contributes to a lower
GDP in 1979, because the low growth may have generated less income for the
government and thus led to larger budget deficits and because countries with
low growth faced higher interest rates because of higher default risk. If there
was some variable that reduced growth in the 1970s that also had the same
effect on growth in the 1980s, this variable indirectly caused a high initial debt
to GDP ratio as well as low growth in the 1980s. However, such a variable
should be persistent over time, and these kinds of variables are controlled for
in the fixed effect panel regressions.
The central government budget surplus is likely to be high in years of
economic expansion and low in years of economic contraction. Including this
variable in a growth regression should therefore be done with great care. The
argument for exogeneity to hold is that we are looking at 10 year averages,
and that cyclical effects will be canceled out over this period. However, as
we have seen in the case of Botswana, there might be omitted variables that
cause high growth for more than a decade and gives the government additional
income which causes high budget surpluses. Also here, we would expect such
a variable to be relatively persistent over time, so this problem will be smaller
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in a fixed effect panel regression than in the cross country regression. The
fact that the budget surplus seems to be insignificant in the panel regression,
even though Botswana is included, is a good example of this.
6.3 Specification
The results from the panel regression indicate that the investment rate and
the initial level of government debt are significantly correlated to the growth
rate, but that the impact is so low that even very large improvements on these
will have small effects on the growth rate. However, it might be too soon to
conclude that these two variables have no economically significant impact
on growth. One possibility is that government debt and inflation have no
impact on growth as long as they are at moderate levels, but when they cross
a threshold it becomes detrimental to economic growth.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) showed that government debt have no sig-
nificant impact on growth until it reaches 90 percent of GDP. Above this
threshold, there is a sharp drop in growth rates.15 A reasoning behind this
may be that it is only when the debt reaches a certain level that the actors
perceive it as unsustainable, and they realize that the government may be
unable to repay.
A similar argument can be made with respect to the inflation rate: At
moderate levels of inflation there is certainty about future price levels, and it
might not have any impact on economic growth. It is only when the inflation
rate reaches a certain level that it becomes detrimental to growth. It is also
possible to argue that as long as it is above this level it does not matter how
high the inflation is, because above this threshold the price as an information
mechanism has ceased to function.
To check if a threshold model, where debt and inflation has no impact
at moderate levels, but has a negative impact on growth when it reaches a
certain level, I generated dummy variables. One dummy that equals one if the
initial government debt to GDP ratio is above 90 percent and zero otherwise
and one that equals one if the average rate of inflation is above 25 percent
and zero otherwise. These were included in the panel regression instead of
the original inflation and debt variables.
Of the 166 observations there were 20 that had initial government debt
level above 90 percent of GDP, their per capita GDP growth rate averaged
1.7 percent, while the 146 observations that had initial government debt of
less than 90 percent had an average growth rate of 2.5 percent. There were 20
observations with average inflation above 25 percent. Their average annual
growth rate was 0.7 percent, while the average growth rate for the 146 ob-
servations with moderate inflation rates was 2.6 percent. For the rest of the
15 Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash and Robert Pollin of the University of Massachusetts discov-
ered a coding error in the excel spreadsheet of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) that caused these results
to be biased. However, Reinhart and Rogoff argue that this was just one of several calculations,
and that their main result still holds (The Economist, 2013).
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Tab. 7: Dummies for high debt and inflation (in the panel regression)
(1) (2) (3)
GR INV GR
BS 0.0189 0.349 0.0249
(0.24) (1.31) (0.30)
SDRER -0.00315 -0.00177 -0.00336
(-0.58) (-0.09) (-0.60)
Hinf -0.0194*** -0.00100 -0.0209*
(-3.01) (-0.04) (-1.86)






F-statistic 5.102 0.916 3.320
p-value 0.00118 0.460 0.00643
N 166 164 166
t statistics in parentheses
* p ă 0.10, ** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01
(1) and (2) shows the results from Tab. 5 (2) and (4), respectively, when CPinf and debtX9 are
replaced with the following dummies: Hinf, that equals 1 if average inflation rate is above 25
percent and 0 otherwise. And Hdebt, that equals 1 if the initial government debt to GDP ratio is
above 90 percent and 0 otherwise. (3) shows the results of the same regression as (1) when the
original variables are included in addition to the dummies.
section I will refer to an inflation level of below 25 percent as moderate, and
as high if it is above this level. Similarly I will refer to the government debt
level as sustainable if it is below 90 percent, and unsustainable if it is above
this level. This is not to say that I believe that there exists sharp thresholds
like these. At what level a government’s debt is sustainable or what a moder-
ate inflation rate is, depends on many different circumstances, and probably
differs between countries and time periods. These labels are simplifications
to make the discussion easier to follow.
The results of the growth and investment regressions are shown in Tab. 7.
The estimates from the panel regression indicate that the impact of debt and
inflation is higher than it seemed in section 5.3. We see that going from
a moderate to a high inflation is associated with a drop in average annual
growth rate of around two percentage points, while going from a sustainable
level of government debt to an unsustainable level is associated with a drop
in the growth rate of around 1.6 percentage points. Their t-values are higher
than in Tab. 5, which indicates that the new specification fits better to the
data than the old one.
If this threshold specification is a good approximation to reality, we would
expect the effect of the original variables to disappear when they are included
in the regression, together with the dummies. The results when both the
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dummies and their original variables are included in the regression are shown
in column (3). None of them are significant at a five percent level, but the
t-values of CPinf and debtX9 are close to zero, while the t-values of Hinf and
Hdebt are -1.86 and -1.36 respectively. The coefficient estimates are roughly
the same for the dummies as in column (1), while they are close to zero for
the original variables. This indicates that the threshold model fits the data
fairly well, but that collinearity problems make the standard errors large.
In the investment regression (see column (2)), it still seems like none of
the variables have any significant impact on investment. Even though it is
not statistically significant, the coefficient estimate of the government budget
balance does indicate that there might be an effect. As discussed earlier this
is not necessarily an indication that macroeconomic instability is associated
with a lower investment rate, but rather that government borrowing causes
investments to shift from real capital to government bonds (crowding out).
It is also worth noticing that the t-value of the debt coefficient is higher than
in the original regression, though it is still insignificant.
The evidence indicates that rather than being a linear relationship between
these variables and growth, there are sustainable and unsustainable levels of
debt and inflation, and crossing these thresholds is what inhibits growth.
If this is so, and the estimates can be trusted, this changes the conclusion
that these variables have an economically insignificant impact on growth. We
have to be careful when interpreting these point estimates, because there are
large standard errors, but effects of 1.6 and 2 percentage point changes in
average annual growth rates are pretty extraordinary. However, this is not
necessarily an indication that macroeconomic instability is very detrimental
to growth. It only tells us that very high inflation and initial government
debt are negatively associated with economic growth. I therefore find it more
useful to look at each one of these variables individually in order to assess the
possible mechanisms at work.
6.4 Mechanisms
In chapter 2, I presented theories that explain how macroeconomic insta-
bility can influence growth. On the general level, the theories predict that
macroeconomic stability inhibits growth through causing a lower level of in-
vestments. I find no evidence that macroeconomic instability in general, as
measured by all the indicators, affect the level of investments. I therefore
find it little relevant to focus on this mechanism here, and prefer to look
at the indicators identified as significant separately, when discussing possible
mechanisms through which they can affect growth.
While Bleaney’s (1996) analysis indicated that the central government
budget surplus and the real exchange rate volatility were the variables that
were most closely related to growth, the results from the panel regression
suggests that the inflation rate and initial debt level were the ones related to
the growth rate. Bleaney’s result could possibly be explained by the crowd-
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ing out effect budget deficits have on investments in productive capital (see
section 2.1), and by the effect that real exchange rate volatility can have on
development of industrial clusters (see section 2.4). However, my results and
the results of the Bleaney (1996) replication after excluding outliers indicate
that his results are not very robust. I will therefore focus the discussion in this
section on possible mechanisms at work that causes high initial government
debt and high inflation to be detrimental to economic growth.
Due to lack of easily available data, I have not been able to test if there
is any evidence of the mechanisms I suggest. However, I have chosen to
present them to show that a causal relationship between these variables (high
initial government debt and high inflation) and growth may exist, and give
the reader an idea of the possible mechanisms at work.
6.4.1 Debt overhang
When a country’s public debt is at a level where investors realize that it is
unlikely that the country will be able to repay it, we would expect investors
to be very reluctant to buy government bonds from that country. This will
seriously limit the government’s access to credit and make it hard to finance
even projects that would have yielded great returns. This means that we
can expect investments that are typically done by the government, like in-
vestments in infrastructure, health and education, to be lower if the country
suffers from a debt overhang. Another reason why countries with high debt
levels have less to spend on good investments is that they have to use a larger
share of their available resources on debt repayment.
It is also possible that this might affect private investment as well. As
we have seen in the recent financial crisis, when the government bond loses
its value, domestic banks that hold many of these bonds will have problems
getting access to credit themselves, which again will affect the credit access
for domestic firms. Another possibility is that investors realize that the gov-
ernment has to increase taxes in the future in order to reduce the debt level.
Since they do not know which taxes they will increase, it increases the risk of
new investments, and thus has a negative impact on the investment rate.
Although there is no conclusive evidence that the initial debt level is as-
sociated with the investment rate, this should not be interpreted as evidence
that such a relationship does not exist. Due to lack of good control variables,
the standard errors of the estimates in all the investment regressions are so
large that none of the regressors (including the control variables) are signifi-
cant at a five percent level. Due to lack of data on public investments, I have
not been able to test whether high initial government debt is associated with
a lower level of public investments.
An interesting observation is that while high budget deficits are not associ-
ated with lower growth, it will normally contribute to increasing government
debt, which in turn will have a negative impact on growth in the future.
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6.4.2 High inflation
While the estimate of the coefficient of the high inflation dummy in the growth
regression is large and significant at every reasonable significance level, this is
not the case in the investment regression. This can be interpreted as evidence
that a high inflation rate affects growth through other channels than the
investment rate. One possibility is that high inflation is bad for the quality
of investments (Bleaney, 1996). Another possibility is that it distorts relative
prices and inhibits an efficient allocation of resources (Fischer, 1983).
As mentioned earlier the level and volatility of the inflation rate are so
highly correlated that it is practically impossible to distinguish one from the
other, especially because I only have yearly data. In addition to uncertainty
about future price levels, there is also reason to believe that high inflation
distorts relative prices. Tommasi (1992) showed that inflation in Argentina
also was associated with instability in relative prices, and Fischer et al. (1981)
showed that unanticipated monetary shocks are related to distortions in rel-
ative prices.
With this in mind we can think of two main reasons why the quality of
investments should be affected by the level of inflation. The first is that
demand depends on the general price level, at least in a world with sticky
wages, and when future price level is uncertain it is hard to calculate future
demand. When uncertainty about demand is high, the likelihood of making
an investment that does not yield high return is also high. The second reason
is that firms may plan to use a combination of inputs that seemed rational
according to their expectations of relative prices, but the relative prices may
turn out to be different from what they expected when they planned the pro-
duction. In addition to difficulties in planning the use of inputs, the relative
price level is also an important factor in determining demand for the product
the firm is producing. Therefore even though investments are made, they do
not generate growth because the investors fail to foresee future demand and
future relative prices. However, I find it unlikely that the inflation rate has
such a large effect on the quality of investments when there does not seem to
be any effect on the investment rate.
High inflation also reduces the efficiency of the price mechanism, and thus
causes an inefficient allocation of resources that in turn reduces the total
factor productivity (Fischer, 1993). Especially in cases where reallocation
of resources plays an important role in the growth process, high inflation
disturbs this reallocation and thus inhibits growth.
This problem will be especially severe in times of extreme inflation. It is
often seen that inflation crises cause collapses of the economy (Capie, 1991).
Although these crises are short and the economy recovers quickly after the
crisis, it might be enough to have a significant impact on the 10 year average
growth rate. Bruno and Easterly (1998) find no significant effects of inflation
on growth in the cross section regression with 30 year averages. They show
that periods of inflation crisis (inflation rate above 40 percent) are associated
with periods of negative growth, but that growth quickly recovers after the
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inflation is down to moderate levels again. They also argue that the growth
following the end of an inflation crisis is so high that it "cancels out some –
or possibly all – of the output lost during the high inflation crisis" (Bruno
and Easterly, 1998, p. 4).
By looking at the raw data, it seems like years with very high inflation
are associated with negative growth, but there is no clear sign of a quick and
strong recovery: If I define an inflation crisis as a period with inflation above
100 percent, the average length of the crisis in my sample is 3.35 years, the
average growth rate in crisis years was ´3.9 percent and the average growth
rate the year after the crisis was 0.7 percent (the average growth rate in my
sample is 2.2 percent).
These numbers show that it is absolutely plausible that the association
between high inflation and low growth might be a result of economic contrac-
tions during periods of high inflation, and that these are not compensated for
by strong recoveries.
6.5 Heterogeneous effects
Economic growth occurs in different countries for different reasons. There is
no single policy, institution or culture that promotes growth independent of
the circumstances in which they exist. Even though country specific effects
are controlled for in the panel regressions, I do not control for how different
circumstances in each country interact with the variables of interest. This
is hard to do because it is hard to know what these circumstances are, and
how to measure them. Hence, it is only the variables that have more or less
the same effect in most of the countries that will appear as significant in this
type of regressions.
As mentioned in section 2.4, a stable real exchange rate is only one condi-
tion that has to be fulfilled in order for industrial clusters to develop. There
are probably many more conditions that must be in place for this to happen,
which I do not control for. In addition, development of industrial clusters
may be one way of generating economic growth in a country, but there are
many other reasons why growth can occur.
Unless very clever ways of controlling for complex interactions between
variables that can hardly be measured, quantitative empirical research can
only tell us so much about what generates economic growth. This is not
to say we should stop doing it, but our conclusions should be drawn with
care, and we should combine quantitative methods with qualitative analysis
of historical events. However, this thesis is only a small contribution in the
debate, and I have therefore chosen to focus on the quantitative analysis,
rather than looking into historical examples.
7. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate to which extent the results
Bleaney (1996) found hold when additional data is used and when country
fixed effects are controlled for. I have shown that there are several weaknesses
with his analysis that causes biases in his results. Since he does not control
for country specific factors that might affect both the regressors and growth,
his estimates of the coefficients of the budget balance and real exchange rate
volatility are respectively upward and downward biased. In combination with
a small sample, in which outliers have a great impact on the estimates, this
leads him to greatly overstate the effect that these variables have on economic
growth.
Of the four indicators of macroeconomic instability included in this the-
sis, only the inflation rate and the initial government debt level seem to be
significantly associated with economic growth. In the first fixed effect regres-
sion analysis it seems like the effect of these two variables were economically
insignificant. However, this seems to be a result of the way the equation
was specified. By using dummy variables for high inflation and high initial
government debt, I showed that a threshold model fits the data better than
the linear effects model. I find evidence that initial government debt and
inflation rates have no impact on growth rate as long as they are at moderate
levels, but when they reach levels that can be regarded as unsustainable, the
negative impact on growth is substantial.
I argue that high initial debt levels make it impossible for governments
to get access to new loans, and that this has adverse effect on productivity
enhancing public – and possibly also private – investments. I also argue that
the explanation of the association between high inflation and growth is that
inflation crises cause economic collapses that are not neutralized by quick
recoveries.
While I find no econometric evidence that the budget surplus and real
exchange rate affects growth, there is no reason to conclude that they do not
matter for growth. I argue the effect that these, and many other, variables
have on economic growth are dependent on the circumstances in which they
operate. It is therefore hard to measure them in normal regression analysis.
To get guidance on which policies to pursue, one has to combine traditional
econometric analysis with economic theory and qualitative analysis of histor-
ical events.
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Appendix A
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND DATA SOURCES
GR - Growth in GDP per capita. Data is from the World Bank’s Interna-
tional Development Indicators database. Where data was not avail-
able, I used data from IMF’s International Financial Statistics database
(IFS).
Lgr - Population growth. Data is from the World Bank’s International De-
velopment Indicators database. Where data was not available, I used
data from IMF’s International Financial Statistics database (IFS).
INV - Gross capital formation as percentage of GDP. Data is from theWorld
Bank’s International Development Indicators database. Where data was
not available, I used data from the Penn World Tables.
lGDPX9 - Log of initial GDP per capita in current USD. From theWorld Bank’s
International Development Indicators database.16
SDRER - Standard deviation of log(real effective exchange rate). Where avail-
able, I have used the real effective exchange rate (2005 index) as given
by the IMF IFS database. When missing I have used the exchange rate
against the U.S. dollar, downloaded from theWorld Bank’s International
Development Indicators database, and the consumer price indeces from
IMFs IFS database, in the following way:
RERi “ CPIUS ˚ E
CPIi
, E “ The exchange rate against USD
BS - Central government budget surplus as percentage of GDP. The data is
from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics database. Where data
was not available I used data from the World Bank’s International De-
velopment Indicators database. For some values that were still missing,
I used data from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics yearbooks
from 1992 and 2000.
CPinf - Inflation (consumer prices). Arithmetic mean, truncated at 100 % if
average inflation was above this level. The data is from the IMF’s IFS
database.
16 For 1979, data was unavailable for Bahrain, Bhutan and Ethiopia. These were replaced with
data from http://kushnirs.org/macroeconomics/gdp.
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Hinf - High inflation dummy. A dummy that equals 1 if CPinf is above 25 %
and 0 otherwise.
debtX9 - Initial central government debt to GDP ratio. Central government
debt to GDP ratio in 1979, 1989 and 1999. The data is from the Inter-
American Development bank’s dataset Public Debt around the World:
A New Dataset of Central Government Debt.
Hdebt - High debt dummy. A dummy that equals 1 if debtX9 is above 90 %
and 0 otherwise.
HIC - Highly indebted country. A dummy that equals 1 if the country was
classified as a higly indebted country by the World Bank in 1989, and 0
otherwise.
NXYgr - Growth in the exports to GDP ratio. Data from the IMF’s IFS database.
NXYX9 - Initial exports to GDP ratio. Data from the IMF’s IFS database.
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Fig. 5: Investment to GDP ratio and per capita growth (average 1980-2009)
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Tab. 8: Coefficient estimates on control variables (OLS regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GR GR GR GR
Lgr -0.0120*** -0.00715** -0.0109*** -0.00912***
(-3.14) (-2.30) (-4.86) (-5.55)
INV 0.253*** 0.0709** 0.0833** 0.0970***
(3.64) (2.23) (2.29) (4.33)
NXYgr 0.000371 -0.000135 -0.000430 -0.000746*
(0.40) (-0.15) (-0.70) (-1.79)
lGDPX9 -0.0127*** 0.00256 -0.00686*** -0.00455***





Constant 0.0795** 0.00425 0.0788*** 0.0522***
(2.70) (0.18) (3.92) (3.83)
N 44 52 70 166
t statistics in parentheses
* p ă 0.10, ** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01
d90 and d00 are dummies for the 1990s and 2000s, respectively.
Tab. 9: Coefficient estimates on control variables (panel regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GR GR GR INV INV
Lgr -0.00405 -0.00215 -0.00229
(-1.03) (-0.47) (-0.49)
INV 0.0377 0.0401 0.0867**
(1.12) (1.10) (2.40)
lGDPX9 -0.0361*** -0.0347*** -0.0353***
(-7.11) (-5.93) (-6.14)
NXYgr 0.000410 0.000239 0.000155 0.0000130 -0.000885
(1.02) (0.55) (0.36) (0.01) (-0.52)
d90 0.0141*** 0.0174*** 0.0178*** -0.00406 -0.00554
(3.60) (4.01) (4.25) (-0.31) (-0.48)
d00 0.0326*** 0.0365*** 0.0365*** -0.0151 -0.0157
(5.36) (5.24) (5.36) (-1.00) (-1.17)
NXYX9 -0.0340 -0.0592
(-0.42) (-0.80)
Constant 0.267*** 0.256*** 0.250*** 0.270*** 0.272***
(7.42) (6.23) (6.25) (8.92) (10.19)
N 174 166 166 164 170
t statistics in parentheses
* p ă 0.10, ** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01
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Tab. 10: List of countries included in the regressions
Country Code 80s 90s 00s
Argentina ARG 1 1 0
Armenia ARM 0 0 1
Bahamas BHS 0 1 0
Bahrain BHR 1 1 0
Bangladesh BGD 0 0 1
Belarus BLR 0 0 1
Belize BLZ 0 1 0
Benin BEN 0 0 1
Bhutan BTN 0 1 1
Bolivia BOL 1 1 1
Botswana BWA 1 1 0
Brazil BRA 1 1 1
Bulgaria BGR 0 0 1
Burkina Faso BFA 1 0 1
Burundi BDI 0 1 0
Cambodia KHM 0 0 1
Cameroon CMR 0 1 0
Chile CHL 1 1 1
Colombia COL 1 1 1
Congo ZAR 0 0 1
Costa Rica CRI 1 1 1
Cote d’Ivoire CIV 0 0 0
Croatia HRV 0 0 1
Cyprus CYP 1 1 1
Czech Republic CZE 0 0 1
Dominican Republic DOM 1 1 1
Ecuador ECU 1 0 0
Egypt EGY 1 1 1
El Salvador SLV 0 1 1
Estonia EST 0 0 1
Ethiopia ETH 1 1 1
Fiji FJI 1 1 0
Georgia GEO 0 0 1
Ghana GHA 0 0 1
Guatemala GTM 1 1 1
Honduras HND 0 0 1
Hong Kong HKG 0 0 1
Hungary HUN 0 1 1
India IND 1 1 1
Indonesia IDN 1 1 1
Iran IRN 1 1 1
Israel ISR 1 1 1
Jamaica JAM 0 1 1
Jordan JOR 1 1 1
Kazakhstan KAZ 0 0 1
Country Code 80s 90s 00s
Kenya KEN 1 1 1
Korea KOR 1 1 1
Latvia LVA 0 0 1
Lesotho LSO 0 1 1
Lithuania LTU 0 0 1
Madagascar MDG 0 1 1
Malawi MWI 1 0 0
Malaysia MYS 1 1 1
Mali MLI 0 0 1
Malta MLT 1 1 1
Mauritius MUS 1 1 1
Mexico MEX 1 1 0
Mongolia MNG 0 0 1
Morocco MAR 1 1 1
Namibia NAM 0 0 1
Nepal NPL 1 1 1
Nicaragua NIC 1 0 1
Pakistan PAK 1 1 1
Panama PAN 0 1 0
Papua New Guinea PNG 0 1 0
Paraguay PRY 1 1 1
Peru PER 1 1 1
Philippines PHL 1 1 1
Poland POL 0 0 1
Romania ROM 0 0 1
Russia RUS 0 0 1
Seychelles SYC 0 1 1
Sierra Leone SLE 0 0 1
Slovak SVK 0 0 1
Slovenia SVN 0 0 1
South Africa ZAF 1 1 1
Sri Lanka LKA 1 1 1
Syrian Arab Republic SYR 0 1 0
Thailand THA 1 1 1
Togo TGO 1 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 1 0 1
Tunisia TUN 0 1 1
Turkey TUR 1 1 0
Uganda UGA 0 0 1
Ukraine UKR 0 0 1
Uruguay URY 1 1 1
Venezuela VEN 1 1 0
Zambia ZMB 0 0 1
Zimbabwe ZWE 1 0 0
Sum 44 52 70
1 indicates that there is available data for that country in the respective decade. Countries with
data available for at least two decades are included in the panel regression. There are 48 countries
with data available for at least two decades. Toghether they form 126 observations, that are used
to calculate the coefficients. The regression table (Tab. 5 (2)) reports N=166, because "Stata does
not drop panels with only one observation, because they provide information about the constant,
the variance components, the between R-sq, the overall R-sq and the correlation between the ui
and Xb" (Drukker, 2002).
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Tab. 11: Main dataset
Country Decade GR Lgr INV NXYgr lGDPX9 BS SDRER CPinf debtX9
Argentina 1980 -0.022 0.015 0.199 0.087 7.824 -0.055 0.429 1.000 0.146
Argentina 1990 0.032 0.013 0.178 -0.016 7.775 -0.003 0.162 1.000 0.731
Armenia 2000 0.087 0.000 0.289 -0.019 6.392 -0.017 0.151 0.035 0.643
Bahamas 1990 0.001 0.016 0.277 -0.011 9.406 -0.011 0.036 0.028 0.228
Bahrain 1980 -0.008 0.034 0.343 0.001 8.939 0.019 0.180 0.023 0.234
Bahrain 1990 0.027 0.027 0.188 -0.017 8.998 -0.010 0.039 0.008 0.188
Bangladesh 2000 0.043 0.014 0.239 0.041 5.884 -0.009 0.049 0.058 0.313
Belarus 2000 0.078 -0.005 0.295 -0.013 7.098 0.004 1.358 0.372 0.183
Belize 1990 0.028 0.028 0.237 -0.003 7.592 -0.046 0.020 0.022 0.377
Benin 2000 0.011 0.031 0.198 -0.022 5.933 -0.007 0.192 0.034 0.677
Bhutan 1990 0.053 0.000 0.396 0.026 6.212 0.005 0.090 0.099 0.539
Bhutan 2000 0.056 0.025 0.502 0.042 6.626 -0.022 0.101 0.049 0.405
Bolivia 1980 -0.026 0.022 0.153 0.064 6.739 -0.077 0.428 1.000 0.767
Bolivia 1990 0.017 0.022 0.169 -0.026 6.586 -0.025 0.041 0.104 0.876
Bolivia 2000 0.018 0.018 0.151 0.085 6.926 -0.034 0.101 0.051 0.724
Botswana 1980 0.078 0.034 0.300 0.029 6.750 0.092 0.219 0.108 0.159
Botswana 1990 0.032 0.025 0.291 -0.013 7.740 0.120 0.104 0.108 0.214
Brazil 1980 0.008 0.021 0.210 0.052 7.545 -0.086 0.164 1.000 0.372
Brazil 1990 0.001 0.016 0.185 0.013 7.970 -0.025 0.145 1.000 0.239
Brazil 2000 0.021 0.012 0.175 0.022 8.135 -0.024 0.198 0.069 0.416
Bulgaria 2000 0.055 -0.008 0.262 -0.001 7.385 0.014 0.132 0.068 0.816
Burkina Faso 1980 0.011 0.025 0.180 -0.001 5.514 -0.004 0.188 0.050 0.158
Burkina Faso 2000 0.023 0.029 0.188 0.033 5.530 -0.045 0.190 0.030 0.525
Burundi 1990 -0.028 0.014 0.091 0.049 5.317 -0.047 0.113 0.135 0.785
Cambodia 2000 0.069 0.013 0.191 0.043 5.662 -0.019 0.104 0.051 0.328
Cameroon 1990 -0.021 0.026 0.148 0.011 6.847 -0.019 0.212 0.056 0.321
Chile 1980 0.027 0.016 0.185 0.054 7.540 -0.005 0.305 0.214 0.438
Chile 1990 0.047 0.016 0.253 -0.017 7.692 0.012 0.100 0.118 0.487
Chile 2000 0.026 0.011 0.221 0.025 8.475 0.023 0.060 0.035 0.415
Colombia 1980 0.012 0.021 0.194 0.030 6.969 -0.026 0.290 0.235 0.182
Colombia 1990 0.010 0.018 0.199 0.006 7.102 -0.017 0.170 0.222 0.330
Colombia 2000 0.025 0.015 0.198 -0.011 7.698 -0.046 0.107 0.063 0.377
Congo 2000 0.007 0.028 0.128 -0.011 4.578 -0.008 0.647 1.000 3.065
Costa Rica 1980 -0.005 0.027 0.196 0.044 7.479 -0.023 0.171 0.271 0.524
Costa Rica 1990 0.029 0.025 0.187 0.042 7.738 -0.017 0.037 0.169 0.878
Costa Rica 2000 0.022 0.018 0.223 -0.017 8.324 -0.011 0.044 0.109 0.266
Croatia 2000 0.034 -0.003 0.261 -0.010 8.531 -0.028 0.054 0.032 0.428
Cyprus 1980 0.048 0.010 0.307 0.016 7.847 -0.050 0.073 0.058 0.225
Cyprus 1990 0.025 0.021 0.230 0.002 8.992 -0.024 0.026 0.039 0.509
Cyprus 2000 0.017 0.016 0.196 -0.022 9.564 -0.002 0.063 0.028 2.736
Czech Republic 2000 0.034 0.002 0.279 0.012 8.707 -0.039 0.141 0.028 0.337
Dominican Republic 1980 0.015 0.022 0.226 0.060 6.879 -0.015 0.266 0.209 0.228
Dominican Republic 1990 0.031 0.018 0.198 0.022 6.855 0.004 0.069 0.153 0.471
Dominican Republic 2000 0.036 0.015 0.182 -0.038 7.850 -0.008 0.117 0.131 0.216
Ecuador 1980 -0.003 0.026 0.202 0.018 7.122 -0.015 0.362 0.340 0.459
Egypt 1980 0.034 0.024 0.286 -0.023 6.024 -0.024 0.328 0.174 0.834
Egypt 1990 0.025 0.018 0.209 -0.008 6.568 0.009 0.174 0.105 0.416
Egypt 2000 0.030 0.018 0.189 0.061 7.219 -0.066 0.182 0.075 0.343
El Salvador 1990 0.037 0.012 0.170 0.038 6.723 -0.031 0.144 0.106 0.659
El Salvador 2000 0.016 0.004 0.161 -0.005 7.654 -0.024 0.037 0.036 0.404
Estonia 2000 0.048 -0.003 0.314 -0.004 8.331 0.010 0.225 0.043 0.392
Ethiopia 1980 0.012 0.030 0.154 -0.012 5.063 -0.069 0.051 0.046 0.094
Ethiopia 1990 -0.005 0.031 0.165 0.071 5.496 -0.039 0.418 0.080 0.327
Ethiopia 2000 0.055 0.024 0.226 -0.007 4.753 -0.039 0.216 0.109 0.698
Fiji 1980 -0.007 0.015 0.211 0.037 7.403 -0.037 0.173 0.075 0.173
Fiji 1990 0.021 0.011 0.181 -0.001 7.398 -0.029 0.058 0.042 0.336
Georgia 2000 0.060 -0.001 0.284 0.049 6.444 -0.009 0.112 0.063 0.590
Ghana 2000 0.029 0.024 0.229 0.055 6.022 -0.043 0.056 0.185 0.832
Guatemala 1980 -0.014 0.024 0.133 -0.009 6.913 -0.028 0.212 0.121 0.164
Guatemala 1990 0.017 0.023 0.155 0.012 6.871 -0.008 0.111 0.148 0.302
Guatemala 2000 0.009 0.025 0.190 0.030 7.420 -0.018 0.140 0.070 0.254
Honduras 2000 0.023 0.020 0.279 0.007 6.782 -0.013 0.074 0.082 0.830
Hong Kong 2000 0.036 0.006 0.229 0.044 10.130 0.019 0.076 -0.002 2.177
Hungary 1990 -0.002 -0.002 0.226 0.075 7.931 -0.059 0.098 0.222 0.628
Hungary 2000 0.025 -0.002 0.239 0.022 8.458 -0.057 0.119 0.061 0.543
India 1980 0.033 0.022 0.221 0.002 5.425 -0.021 0.111 0.088 0.124
India 1990 0.037 0.019 0.239 0.053 5.864 -0.028 0.103 0.095 0.511
India 2000 0.053 0.015 0.313 0.061 6.105 -0.036 0.100 0.056 0.224
Indonesia 1980 0.042 0.021 0.286 -0.011 5.924 -0.012 0.285 0.096 0.281
Indonesia 1990 0.033 0.015 0.276 0.067 6.328 0.004 0.315 0.145 0.437
Indonesia 2000 0.039 0.012 0.250 -0.033 6.499 -0.012 0.164 0.084 0.996
Iran 1980 -0.038 0.034 0.229 0.020 7.747 -0.078 0.210 0.198 0.098
Iran 1990 0.027 0.017 0.349 0.129 7.665 -0.010 0.451 0.237 0.053
Iran 2000 0.037 0.013 0.331 0.027 7.395 0.027 0.167 0.153 0.103
Israel 1980 0.018 0.018 0.206 -0.021 8.439 -0.059 0.048 1.000 0.852
Israel 1990 0.024 0.030 0.241 -0.004 9.197 -0.032 0.035 0.112 1.631
Israel 2000 0.015 0.020 0.187 0.006 9.803 -0.042 0.094 0.020 0.578
Jamaica 1990 0.013 0.008 0.269 -0.002 7.526 -0.039 0.175 0.278 1.131
Jamaica 2000 0.094 0.005 0.261 -0.009 8.140 -0.039 0.067 0.111 0.536
Jordan 1980 0.001 0.038 0.293 0.065 7.350 -0.081 0.131 0.070 0.434
Jordan 1990 0.006 0.043 0.294 -0.023 7.209 -0.010 0.014 0.051 1.721
Jordan 2000 0.041 0.023 0.261 0.009 7.463 -0.032 0.063 0.039 0.992
Kazakhstan 2000 0.078 0.008 0.282 0.013 7.030 0.008 0.229 0.092 0.350
Kenya 1980 0.004 0.037 0.232 -0.021 5.987 -0.060 0.142 0.118 0.314
Kenya 1990 -0.007 0.030 0.183 0.009 5.901 -0.025 0.104 0.174 0.503
Kenya 2000 0.010 0.026 0.179 0.014 6.048 -0.011 0.284 0.109 0.503
Korea 1980 0.064 0.012 0.304 0.022 7.466 0.011 0.114 0.084 0.363
Korea 1990 0.052 0.010 0.354 0.024 8.601 0.018 0.162 0.057 0.095
Korea 2000 0.038 0.005 0.295 0.034 9.165 0.019 0.116 0.031 0.316
Latvia 2000 0.054 -0.006 0.305 0.009 8.023 -0.017 0.202 0.059 0.447
Lesotho 1990 0.022 0.018 0.654 0.048 5.630 0.021 0.102 0.124 0.863
Lesotho 2000 0.027 0.011 0.297 0.065 6.004 0.031 0.168 0.077 0.692
Lithuania 2000 0.054 -0.005 0.222 0.038 8.043 -0.021 0.203 0.030 0.365
Appendix B. Figures and tables 50
Country Decade GR Lgr INV NXYgr lGDPX9 BS SDRER CPinf debtX9
Madagascar 1990 -0.015 0.031 0.124 0.044 5.430 -0.026 0.098 0.173 1.182
Madagascar 2000 0.001 0.030 0.242 0.039 5.520 -0.030 0.144 0.105 1.211
Malawi 1980 -0.023 0.040 0.194 -0.006 5.164 -0.080 0.080 0.168 0.559
Malaysia 1980 0.030 0.027 0.278 0.026 7.378 -0.058 0.143 0.037 0.229
Malaysia 1990 0.045 0.026 0.363 0.057 7.694 0.008 0.097 0.037 0.855
Malaysia 2000 0.027 0.020 0.230 -0.027 8.149 -0.040 0.035 0.022 0.522
Mali 2000 0.022 0.031 0.228 0.025 5.457 0.005 0.170 0.026 1.094
Malta 1980 0.029 0.011 0.258 -0.007 8.070 0.007 0.069 0.036 0.590
Malta 1990 0.044 0.008 0.255 0.004 8.706 -0.053 0.036 0.030 0.176
Malta 2000 0.011 0.009 0.178 0.003 9.240 -0.047 0.063 0.025 1.835
Mauritius 1980 0.033 0.010 0.236 0.045 7.153 -0.032 0.161 0.112 0.323
Mauritius 1990 0.040 0.011 0.282 0.000 7.644 -0.009 0.072 0.076 0.424
Mauritius 2000 0.034 0.008 0.242 -0.023 8.203 -0.021 0.085 0.060 0.306
Mexico 1980 0.002 0.021 0.223 0.067 7.603 -0.079 0.216 0.690 0.291
Mexico 1990 0.016 0.018 0.230 0.072 7.900 -0.007 0.135 0.204 0.469
Mongolia 2000 0.047 0.013 0.332 -0.005 6.093 0.002 0.129 0.090 0.795
Morocco 1980 0.014 0.024 0.241 0.007 6.719 -0.075 0.136 0.076 0.456
Morocco 1990 0.012 0.016 0.227 0.046 6.837 -0.026 0.052 0.044 1.153
Morocco 2000 0.036 0.011 0.299 0.013 7.232 -0.005 0.031 0.019 0.508
Namibia 2000 0.024 0.019 0.219 0.003 7.512 -0.013 0.182 0.064 0.186
Nepal 1980 0.017 0.024 0.199 -0.004 4.836 -0.065 0.118 0.108 0.077
Nepal 1990 0.023 0.025 0.227 0.086 5.243 -0.056 0.078 0.096 0.482
Nepal 2000 0.019 0.021 0.257 -0.056 5.353 -0.027 0.123 0.060 0.559
Nicaragua 1980 -0.032 0.025 0.214 0.027 6.210 -0.172 3.946 1.000 1.436
Nicaragua 2000 0.017 0.013 0.278 0.052 6.880 -0.019 0.061 0.087 1.751
Pakistan 1980 0.034 0.033 0.187 0.032 5.534 -0.068 0.210 0.073 0.373
Pakistan 1990 0.013 0.026 0.187 0.010 5.913 -0.056 0.047 0.097 0.756
Pakistan 2000 0.027 0.019 0.188 -0.015 6.100 -0.039 0.030 0.080 0.476
Panama 1990 0.035 0.020 0.247 -0.013 7.633 0.009 0.048 0.011 2.439
Papua New Guinea 1990 0.017 0.026 0.214 0.050 6.773 -0.022 0.118 0.087 0.651
Paraguay 1980 0.011 0.029 0.254 0.124 7.003 -0.001 0.254 0.202 0.257
Paraguay 1990 0.001 0.024 0.243 0.011 6.962 0.002 0.062 0.164 0.624
Paraguay 2000 0.002 0.019 0.186 0.030 7.239 0.001 0.126 0.083 0.465
Peru 1980 -0.020 0.023 0.257 -0.036 6.827 -0.043 0.321 1.000 0.598
Peru 1990 0.014 0.018 0.209 0.008 6.876 -0.019 0.085 1.000 0.516
Peru 2000 0.039 0.012 0.203 0.054 7.612 -0.005 0.063 0.026 0.553
Philippines 1980 -0.007 0.027 0.222 0.044 6.399 -0.028 0.172 0.149 0.450
Philippines 1990 0.004 0.023 0.227 0.052 6.563 -0.010 0.088 0.090 0.672
Philippines 2000 0.025 0.019 0.202 -0.031 7.000 -0.028 0.089 0.046 0.766
Poland 2000 0.041 -0.001 0.212 0.052 8.376 -0.041 0.079 0.036 0.323
Romania 2000 0.050 -0.005 0.245 0.013 7.368 -0.030 0.132 0.164 0.259
Russia 2000 0.058 -0.003 0.212 -0.042 7.200 0.039 0.200 0.140 0.892
Seychelles 1990 0.033 0.015 0.303 0.018 8.399 -0.067 0.048 0.020 0.440
Seychelles 2000 0.012 0.008 0.239 0.021 8.955 -0.013 0.139 0.094 0.337
Sierra Leone 2000 0.057 0.035 0.123 -0.007 5.113 -0.047 0.162 0.067 1.885
Slovak 2000 0.045 0.000 0.268 0.018 8.622 -0.043 0.217 0.055 0.471
Slovenia 2000 0.028 0.003 0.272 0.025 9.328 -0.015 0.148 0.049 0.315
South Africa 1980 -0.003 0.025 0.234 -0.022 7.638 -0.028 0.186 0.146 0.220
South Africa 1990 -0.008 0.022 0.167 -0.004 8.195 -0.048 0.086 0.099 0.382
South Africa 2000 0.022 0.013 0.182 0.015 8.040 -0.009 0.109 0.061 0.274
Sri Lanka 1980 0.026 0.015 0.262 -0.019 5.449 -0.112 0.065 0.128 0.447
Sri Lanka 1990 0.040 0.012 0.249 0.028 6.029 -0.064 0.044 0.113 0.717
Sri Lanka 2000 0.042 0.007 0.253 -0.047 6.711 -0.075 0.146 0.107 0.561
Syrian Arab Republic 1990 0.029 0.027 0.227 0.011 6.713 -0.003 0.163 0.082 2.059
Thailand 1980 0.053 0.019 0.294 0.048 6.378 -0.027 0.111 0.058 0.241
Thailand 1990 0.042 0.010 0.363 0.056 7.157 0.006 0.131 0.050 0.233
Thailand 2000 0.031 0.010 0.259 0.018 7.583 -0.007 0.109 0.024 0.719
Togo 1980 -0.006 0.032 0.195 0.032 5.840 -0.029 0.091 0.050 1.089
Trinidad and Tobago 1980 -0.025 0.013 0.225 0.001 8.375 -0.063 0.194 0.117 0.148
Trinidad and Tobago 2000 0.060 0.004 0.206 0.032 8.574 0.013 0.083 0.063 0.384
Tunisia 1990 0.033 0.017 0.260 -0.005 7.146 -0.023 0.014 0.049 0.534
Tunisia 2000 0.036 0.010 0.242 0.011 7.794 -0.023 0.086 0.032 0.570
Turkey 1980 0.019 0.021 0.195 0.031 7.637 -0.047 0.188 0.513 0.139
Turkey 1990 0.023 0.016 0.235 0.035 7.608 -0.059 0.094 0.772 0.382
Uganda 2000 0.038 0.032 0.213 0.069 5.543 -0.018 0.062 0.064 0.684
Ukraine 2000 0.055 -0.008 0.224 -0.011 6.455 -0.015 0.072 0.132 0.629
Uruguay 1980 0.001 0.006 0.149 0.062 7.816 -0.024 0.241 0.576 0.229
Uruguay 1990 0.030 0.006 0.154 -0.042 7.913 -0.009 0.203 0.489 0.327
Uruguay 2000 0.018 0.002 0.174 0.071 8.895 -0.024 0.138 0.086 0.608
Venezuela 1980 -0.029 0.028 0.215 0.029 8.250 0.020 0.324 0.230 0.422
Venezuela 1990 0.003 0.021 0.205 -0.019 7.689 0.001 0.245 0.474 0.725
Zambia 2000 0.026 0.025 0.218 0.037 5.752 -0.001 0.222 0.173 1.994
Zimbabwe 1980 0.014 0.037 0.173 -0.012 6.602 -0.089 0.173 0.128 0.135
